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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze why Mexico has failed to democratize and offer 
recommendations for U.S. policy towards Mexico. The thesis examines the impact of three causal 
variables on the level of democracy in Mexico: civilian control of the military, the fairness of 
Mexico's political party system and U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. This thesis concludes 
that although civilian control of the military is necessary, but not sufficient, for democracy; that 
because Mexico's political party system is unfair, Mexico does not have competitive political 
parties; and that there is some linkage between U.S. economic assistance and democratization in 
Mexico. The prospects for democracy in Mexico are cloudy. For the PRI, there is much to lose 
should Mexico become more democratic. A recommendation for U.S. policy is to develop a 
special relationship with Mexico and prioritize U.S. interests in Mexico. 
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This thesis analyzes Mexico as one of two Latin American countries that have failed to 
become a full democracy. With the exception of Cuba and Mexico, between 1980 and 1990, most 
Latin American countries became democracies: Peru (1980), Argentina (1983), Grenada (1983), 
Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), Panama (1989), Chile (1990), Bolivia (1990), Nicaragua (1990), 
Haiti (1990), and Paraguay (1990). Why did Mexico not become a democracy along with these 
other Latin American countries? The puzzle of the thesis is: Why has Mexico failed to 
democratize? The major questions that are addressed throughout the thesis are: Why does 
Mexico have a military that is subordinated to civilian control, yet no democracy? Why does 
Mexico not have a competitive multi-party political system? And why has U.S. foreign policy 
towards Mexico failed to bring about democratization when the policy has been seemingly 
successful elsewhere in Latin America? 
Chapter II examines the necessity of subordinating the military to civilian control as an 
element of democracy. The chapter analyzes the impact ofMexican civilian control of the military 
on democratization. The Mexican Revolution set the framework for current relations between a 
civilian ruler and the military institution. Traditionally, military generals claimed the presidency 
by initiating coups. The post-Revolutionary years witnessed the decline of the military's influence 
in politics. Since 1940 and through a series of political "controls," Mexican presidents have 
asserted their power over the military. The controls, however, have failed to produce 
democratization in Mexico. 
xvii 
The chapter begins by analyzing the historical (1900-1940) and postwar (1946-1996) 
relations between the Mexican military and the president. The chapter examines how the military 
became subordinated to civilian control through subjective and objective initiatives. Through 
government institution and control by the elites, Mexico's military was subjectively controlled. 
Objective control was established through autonomy, professional training, and depoliticization 
of the military. The chapter analyzes the implications of civilian control of the military by 
employing a case study of the 1994 Chiapas uprising. Finally, the chapter concludes that civilian 
control of the military is necessary, but is not sufficient for democracy. 
Chapter III analyzes the political party system in Mexico and the fairness for all legally 
recognized parties. The chapter begins by introducing Mexico's major political parties and 
providing voting percentages for national and midterm elections. Major parties include the PRI, 
the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Labor 
Party (PT). The chapter then analyzes four indicators to measure the fairness of the political party 
system between the parties: stability in the rules between interparty competition, stable roots in 
society, legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties subordinate to ambitious leaders. The 
chapter concludes that Mexico lacks a viable political party system because the playing field is not 
level for all parties. 
Chapter IV analyzes the role of the United States in "convincing" Mexico to become 
democratic. The chapter explores the history of U.S. foreign policy towards and relations with 
Mexico. The chapter then examines current U.S. policy towards Mexico and how the policy has 
failed to make Mexico's political structure more democratic. Economic assistance is the major 
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U.S. influence on Mexico's political system. The chapter concludes that U.S. influence has played 
a minor role in promoting democracy in Mexico. 
Chapter V concludes that theories introduced throughout the thesis that are applicable to 
other countries have failed miserably when applied to Mexico. Prospects for the future are cloudy 
because of exceedingly high costs to the PRI and the reigning Mexican president. In addition, 
most Mexicans view democracy as rhetoric the PRI espouses to maintain support. 
Mexico's political system directly impacts the United States. A recommendation for the 
United States is to establish a special relationship with Mexico and clearly state U.S. interests. 
There is abundant evidence that democracies most fully satisfy the social and economic demands 
of its citizens. A democratic Mexico also will become more effective in stemming the flow of 




Between 1980 and 1990, observers of regime transitions witnessed a dramatic change in 
Latin America authoritarian regimes shifted to democracy. Brazil was ruled by the military from 
1964 until its return to democracy in 1985. In Argentina, General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri 
was forced to resign after his actions during the start of the Falklands/Malvinas War. By 1983, 
Raul Alfonsin was elected to the presidency and Argentina began its transition to democracy. 
Carlos Saul Menem was elected president in 1989 and succeeded Alfonsin. Other Latin American 
countries that democratized or redemocratized during the 1980s and 1990s include Peru (1980), 
Argentina (1983), Grenada (1983), Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), Panama (1989), Chile (1990), 
Bolivia (1990), Nicaragua (1990), Haiti (1990), and Paraguay (1990). The only two countries that 
failed to transition from authoritarian rule to democracy were the Republic of Cuba and the United 
Mexican States (Mexico). 
Mexico's political regime is unique in Latin America for various reasons. First, unlike all 
other Latin American countries Mexico is not a democracy, but possesses some of the 
characteristics of a democracy. Samuel P. Huntington describes Mexico's political system as 
liberalized-authoritarian because there is a "partial opening of an authoritarian system short of 
choosing government leaders through freely competitive elections."1 
1 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 9. 
Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley classifY Mexico as a stable-limited and 
an inclusionary-authoritarian regime because there has not been an establishment of elite 
consensus, elite unity, and mass participation in elections and other institutional processes.2 
Giovanni Sartori argues that Mexico's political system is "hegemonic" because 
The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. 
Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not 
permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis 
... The implication is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or 
not. While the predominant party remains submissive to the conditions that make for a 
responsible government, no real sanction commits the hegemonic party to responsiveness. 
Whatever its policy, its domination cannot be challenged. 3 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset argue that Mexico's 
political system is "semi-democratic" because the 
political party competition [is] restricted, the freedom and fairness of elections are 
compromised so that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not produce true 
popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and political liberties are so 
uncertain that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express 
themselves peacefully, without fear. 4 
2 Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther, and John Higley. "Elites and Democratic Consolidation 
in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview." Elites and Democratic Consolidation 
in Latin America and Southern Europe. Ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 323-325. 
3 Sartori, Giovanni. "Noncompetitive Systems." Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for 
Analysis. Volume 1. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 230. 
4 Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. "Introduction: What Makes for 
Democracy?" Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. 
2nd ed. Ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 7-8. 
2 
This thesis considers Mexico a semi-democracy because there is some competition between 
political parties yet the competition does not appear fair for each competitor. Elections, though 
appearing more fair in recent years, are still considered "fixed" in the minds of most Mexican 
citizens. For example, 1994 accounts of sudden electrical power outages during the opposition's 
lead during the presidential election resulted in voting ballots being tabulated by hand and a victory 
for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) - the long-standing ruling party. 
In Mexico there are groups that are afraid to voice political opposition for fear that the 
ruling party will suppress their "freedom." Members of opposition parties, and particularly the 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), seem to attract attention from the violent arm of the PRI. 
Deaths of opposition party members are explained as 'personal rancors' of the PRI. 5 
Mexico is unique in that its military has been subordinated to civilian rule for almost 70 
years and it, as an institution, demonstrates virtually no significant political voice. Yet, Mexico 
is not a democracy. In other Latin American countries the military has been a central political 
actor, at times intervening overtly in the political process through coups. Only with the military's 
subordination to civilian rule has democracy been restored. 
Another unique characteristic is that Mexico shares a 2,000 mile border and close 
economic ties with the United States. The United States is considered one of the greatest models 
of democracy in the world and its foreign policy has consistently stressed, at least rhetorically, 
support for democracy throughout the region. Consequently, democratic support has ostensibly 
5 Sady, Scott. "Gunmen Kill Two in Violence-Ridden State." Associated Press. Netscape. 
On-line. May 25, 1996. 
3 
led to U.S. military invasions in Haiti, Panama, and Grenada. Given limited characteristics of a 
democracy, a military that is controlled by civilian authority, and the shared border with the United 
States, why is it that Mexico has not progressed towards democracy? The purpose of this thesis 
is to analyze why Mexico's political system has failed to democratize and what its prospects are 
for democracy. Considering the analysis, the thesis makes recommendations for U.S. foreign 
policy. 
Theoretically, the prospects for democracy in Mexico are relevant for three reasons. First, 
Mexico is a deviant case in that civilian control of the armed forces has failed to produce a 
democracy. Scholars argue that one of the necessary conditions for democracy is the 
subordination of the military to civilian authority because generally when the transition begins, 
there is no civilian control. Since the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), the Mexican military has 
been subordinated for 70 years. Yet, Mexico is a long way from being considered a democracy. 
The second significant aspect of this topic is that U.S. foreign policy has, for many years, 
stressed assisting democratic governments over undemocratic regimes. Rather than the United 
States taking stronger measures to encourage Mexico to become more democratic, the United 
States has practically ignored Mexico's political status in exchange for its economic advantages. 
Finally, this topic is relevant because it reveals an unfair political party system. 
Practically, the thesis is important because of the size and geography of Mexico in relation 
to the United States, Guatemala, and Belize. Each of the countries shares a border with Mexico 
and the events that impact one country could impact another. Both the United States and Mexico 
share a unique relationship through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
4 
Finally, the United States and Mexico are members of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the United Nations (UN). 
A. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
Definitions of democracy vary. Among the possibilities, there are some that stress the 
sources of authority for government, other that stress purposes served by the government, 6 and 
still others that focus on procedures for constituting government. The thesis focuses on procedural 
democracy, as defined by Robert A Dahl and Terry Lynn Karl. According to Dahl, characteristics 
of democracy are: 
opportunities to oppose the government, form political organizations, express oneself on 
political matters without fear of governmental reprisals, read and hear alternative points 
of views, vote by secret ballot in elections in which candidates of different parties compete 
for votes and after which the losing candidates peacefully yield their claim to office to the 
winners, etc.7 
Karl defines democracy as 
a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing 
their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which 
are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited 
military prerogatives. 8 
6 Schumpeter, Joseph, A Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 2nd ed. NY: Harper, 1947. 
7 Dahl, Robert A Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971, p. 20. 
8 Karl, Terry Lynn. "Dilemmas ofDemocratization in Latin America." Comparative Politics 
23.1 (Oct 1990), p. 2. 
5 
Definitions of democracy are important because each scholar views democracy as having 
different characteristics. Dahl and Karl focus on the characteristics of democracy that are found 
in all developed and some developing nations. Scholars use characteristics of democracy to 
measure the presence of democracy in developing nations, such as Mexico. In Mexico, Dahl's 
characteristics of democracy are overwhelmingly absent; Karl's characteristics are mixed. In 
Mexico, the presidential elections are held once every six years, the senate elections every six 
years, and the representative elections every three years. The elections, although regularly 
scheduled, are not held within the context of the law and are frequently referred to by Mexican 
citizens and foreign observers as "riddled with fraud." 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Robert Jervis asserts four levels of analysis that can be applied to explain Mexico's unique 
political configuration: the international, national, bureaucratic, and individual levels. 9 Each level 
of analysis is important to understanding Mexico's failure to become a democracy. The 
international level is important when examining the impact of U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. 
The national level is significant when studying the impact of opposition political parties on the 
PRJ. The leading opposition parties in Mexico are the National Action Party (PAN) and the PRD. 
The bureaucratic level is best understood by examining the internal workings of an 
institution, such as political parties or the military. The individual level investigates the 
performance of an individual, such as a president or a party leader, and his impact on democracy. 
9 Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, pp. 13-31. 
6 
This thesis focuses on the international, national, and bureaucratic levels of analysis. At the 
international level, the thesis examines the role of external actors on Mexico's political regime and 
its transition, especially U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. At the bureaucratic and domestic 
levels, this thesis examines the significance of the military and the level of institutionalization 
within the party system to further understand their impact on the democratization in Mexico. 
Of all of the Latin American countries that transitioned towards democracy from the 1980s 
to the mid-1990s, Mexico and Cuba resisted this "wave"10 of democracy. The puzzle of this thesis 
is: why has Mexico failed to progress towards democracy? This thesis argues that democracy has 
failed to develop in Mexico because ruling elites have not approved of a democratic regime. 
Mexican elites have much to lose should the country transition to democracy. 
Employing a case study of Mexico, the dependent (outcome) variable is the lack of 
democratization, explained below; the three independent (causal) variables to be tested are civilian 
control of the military, foreign assistance, and the degree of institutionalization within the political 
party system. The thesis utilizes preexisting data from scholarly and on-line sources. Although 
the progress of democracy throughout the 20th century will be analyzed, the central focus lies 
between 1988 and 1996. 
10 Huntington refers to a wave of democratization as a "group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that 
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time." 
Huntington, 1991, p. 15. 
7 
For the research of this thesis, scholarly publications were augmented with on-line sources 
(Netscape and LEXIS-NEXIS) and articles on Mexico and other Latin American countries. 
Together, these references produced excellent data for the measurement of variables and their 
impact on Mexico's democratization process. Research for Chapter 2 was conducted by 
performing a word search on the Dudley Knox Library and Monterey International Institute 
Studies catalogues for "Mexico and military," "Mexico and armed forces" and, "Mexico and civil-
military." Foreign Broadcast Information Service on CD-ROM and daily reports provided articles 
formulated from the Mexican and Latin American press that augmented published works. The 
author routinely skimmed journals that focused on occurrences in Latin America. 
The research for Chapter 3 included a trip to the University of California in San Diego's 
Mexican Studies Center and the International Relations/Pacific Studies Library. The author 
accessed an English translation of the Mexican Constitution, articles published by the Institute of 
Federal Elections in Mexico City, and English sources printed elsewhere in Latin America, such 
as the Latinamerican Press. The Mexico and NAFT A Report provided monthly updates of 
political issues and was essential to keeping current of political events. 
Research for Chapter 4 was conducted using State Department dispatches and background 
notes found through Netscape. LatinoLink, an on-line service, provided extensive articles 
specifically related to Latin America. Major American newspapers in LatinoLink's data base 
included the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The News, and the New York Times. The 
News, a Mexican daily newspaper published in Mexico City in English, was another valuable 
source to the author. A subscription to the San Jose Mercury News allowed the researcher to 
8 
keep abreast ofbinational news not printed elsewhere. An example was Mexican nationals who 
have died while fleeing California civil authorities and the status of the events since their 
occurrences. The researcher visited Washington, D.C. to interview military, civilian, and political-
military experts on current U.S. policy towards Mexico, the controversial legislation of the Helms-
Burton Law, and the impact of the Helms-Burton Law on U.S.-Mexican relations. 
C. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, Daniel C. Levy, Kathleen Bruhn, Donald E. Shulz, 
Edward Williams, Cesar Cansino, and Dahl have sought to explain the democratization "wave" 
in Latin America. Mexico, because of its virtual one-party system and civilian rule, is anomalous. 
The PRI has sustained power for 66 years without an opposition party ever winning a national 
election. This thesis will apply existing comparative and theoretical literature to Mexico and 
explain its uniqueness. 
A review of the literature by Cornelius and Craig suggests that political scholars analyzed 
the 1988 national election as the watershed event that would start Mexico's transition towards 
democracy. The voting percentages captured by the PRI were at an all-time low: In 1982, the 
PRI earned 71.0 percent of the votes; in 1988 50.7 percent.u Many predicted the sudden downfall 
of the PRI. The breakup of the PRI was further underscored by President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari during his 1988 inauguration speech. Salinas proclaimed that '"The era of the virtual 
u Craig, Ann L. and Wayne A. Cornelius. "Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in 
Mexico" Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Ed. Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 258. 
9 
one-party system [in Mexico] has ended,"' giving way to a period of '"intense political 
competition."' 12 Throughout Salinas's reign (1988-1994), however, the PRI grew stronger. By 
1994 the results of the national election forced political scientists to reconsider their forecast from 
the previous national election, as PRI presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon 
captured 48.77 percent of all votes. 13 
Theoretically, Dahl explains Mexico's two types of regimes; Levy and Bruhn explain 
Mexico as and case of stable civilian rule. Dahl considers closed hegemonies a reference point and 
provides three types of possible political regimes: competitive oligarchy, democracy, and 
inclusive hegemony. In a competitive oligarchy, public contestation is limited to the elite and the 
masses do not participate in political activities. In a democracy, regimes are "substantially 
popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation." 
In an inclusive hegemony, public contestation by the elite is limited and the masses do have a 
limited political voice. Dahl concludes that the best route to democracy is by way of the increased 
liberalization and public contestation. 14 
Dahl's analysis is relevant because Mexico has pursued a combination of the second and 
third paths. Under President Salinas, political reform granted liberalization to opposition groups, 
12 Cornelius, Wayne A. and Ann L. Craig. The Mexican Political System in Transition. San 
Diego: University of California, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991, p. 1. 
13 
"Too Good to be True? The PRI Over-eggs its Electoral Pudding." Mexico and NAFTA 
Report RM-94-09, Sep 29, 1994, p. 2. 
14 Dahl, 1971, pp. 6-8. 
10 
such as access to the media and limits on campaign expenses of the PRJ. Mexican citizens have 
dissociated themselves from political parties, especially the PRJ, in favor of other political parties 
and groups. The Union of Unions (UU) and the Independent Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers and Peasants (CIOACY5 are groups that have been established in Chiapas as a result of 
members leaving the peasant sector of the PRJ. This thesis assumes that democracy is one 
possible political regime in Mexico. 
Levy and Bruhn further distinguish Mexico on the basis of stable civilian rule. Levy and 
Bruhn select common causal variables (such as state-society relations, political culture, and 
historical sequencing) to explain democratic stability. Mexico, they conclude, is not a democracy 
put possesses characteristics of a "semi-democratic" regime. 16 Levy and Bruhn emphasize how 
Mexico is one of the Latin American countries that does not fit the characteristics of a democracy. 
Donald E. Schulz and Edward L. Williams examine why Mexico has failed to advance from 
an underdeveloped country to an industrialized country. They focus on internal as well as external 
variables that influence democratization. The internal variables are limited to the political parties, 
the emergence of a civil society, the military and its changing roles, state-labor relations, and civil-
15 Harvey, Neil. "Peasant Strategies and Corporatism in Chiapas." Popular Movements and 
Political Change in Mexico. Ed. Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990, pp. 170-217. 
16 Levy, Daniel C and Kathleen Bruhn. "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without 
Democracy." Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. 
2nd Ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995, pp.170-217. 
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military relations; external variables include U.S.-Mexican relations, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, and labor migration. Schulz and Williams classify Mexico as an unstable 
country because of the oil and peso crises in the 1980s and the Chiapas uprising and political 
assassinations in 1994. Moreover, Schulz and Williams believe that Mexico is undergoing a 
political crisis rather than a political transformation. 17 
Similarity, Cesar Cansino argues that the events since the 1988 federal elections and the 
1994 assassinations and uprisings are evidence that the PRJ has begun to "crack and deteriorate." 
Cansino believes that the transformation of Mexico's political system lies in the strength of 
opposition parties and other civil groups. Moreover, he predicts that the future of Mexico's 
political system is "highly uncertain, tense, and potentially explosive."18 
In summary, the demise of the PRJ, as proclaimed in 1988, has not occurred. Dahl 
proposes a path to democracy that is liberalized and inclusive for both the elites and the masses; 
Levy and Bruhn indicate that Mexico is stable under the rule of a civilian leader but is far from 
being a democracy; Schulz and Williams categorize Mexico as in a state of crisis; and Cansino 
argues that political opposition parties and civil groups play a major role in regime transitions. 
These brief arguments conclude that the prospects for democracy are mixed. By analyzing civilian 
control of the military, the political party system, and foreign assistance, this thesis will suggest 
17 Schultz, Donald E. and Edward L. Williams. Mexico Faces the 21st Century. Ed. Donald 
E. Schulz and Edward L. Williams. Westport: Praeger, 1995. 
18 Cansino, Cesar. "Mexico: The Challenge ofDemocracy." Government and Opposition 30.1 
(1995): 60-73. 
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why Mexico's path to democratization has varied from the paths of other Latin American 
countries and evaluate more accurately Mexico's prospects for the future. 
In Chapter II, the thesis analyzes Mexico's civilian control of the military. The primary 
question is: why is it that Mexico has a weak military, but no democracy? Chapter III examines 
Mexico's history and the level of institutionalization within the political party system. Considering 
the level of institutionalization ofthe political system, the puzzle is: why does Mexico not have 
a competitive multi-party political system? Chapter IV examines the role of the U.S. policy 
towards Mexico and how U.S. foreign policy contributes to or undermines the democratization 
of Mexico. Specifically, why has the U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico failed to bring about 
democratization in Mexico? 
recommendations. 
Chapter V contains the conclusions, implications and 
13 
14 
II. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
IN MEXICO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of civilian control of the military on 
democratization in Mexico. Specifically, why is it that Mexico, with a relatively weak military 
(politically speaking), has maintained a semi-democratic political system, rather than fully 
democratizing? Political scientists argue that subordinating the military to civilian rule is a necessary 
condition for democracy. This has transpired in Mexico, yet no democracy has resulted. This thesis 
argues that in Mexico civilian rule over the military is necessary for democracy. 
Sam C. Sarkesian defines civil-military relations as the interaction between an armed 
institution and political civilian leaders. 19 The civilian control of the Mexican military and the impact 
on democratization is a relevant area of Latin American study. Like other Latin American countries, 
Mexico maintains a military subordinate to civilian leadership. The Mexican military is a professional 
force stripped of political involvement and performs as a civic force (beautifying public grounds and 
building hospitals) instead of a defense force. Mexico's military does not deploy outside of its 
borders. Reductions in military expenditures have consistently decreased since the start of the 
twentieth-century. Fewer funds have been another means of controlling the military. 
Recently, however, Mexico's military has become more visible. Mexican President Ernesto 
Zedillo Ponce de Leon's announcement of an army general to fill the most senior police post in 
19 Sarkesian, Sam C. Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism. NY: Pergamon 
Press, 1981, p. 239. 
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Mexico City and the hiring of senior military officers to replace senior policemen may represent a 
greater role in politics for the Mexican military. 
This chapter is important for a few reasons. First, it examines Mexico as a deviant case in that 
civilian control of the armed forces is a necessary condition for democracy. Second, it analyzes the 
relationship between the military and civilians, and its impact on the political system. Third, it raises 
additional issues related to Mexican civil-military relations, from a historical perspective. Fourth it 
raises issues of interest to U.S. agencies even though the Mexican military has not overtly intervened 
in politics in more than 50 years. U.S. agencies that monitor domestic and international events of 
Mexico include the State Department, Department ofDefense, National Security Council, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
In an overview of the chapter, the second section provides historical and current perspectives 
of the Mexican military. The third section analyzes variations of civilian control of the military. The 
fourth section examines the implications of civilian control of the military and the potential for the 
military's involvement in politics. The final section contains the conclusions. A tentative conclusion 
is that Mexican civilian control of the military has not produced a democracy because the ruling 
oligarchy has much to lose should democracy occur. 
In Mexico, the army is by far the dominant service. In 1994, the armed forces comprised 
130,000 in the regular army; 29,000 in the navy; 8,000 in the air force; 8,000 marines; and 14,000 
in the paramilitary's rural rnilitia.20 Most of the information in the chapter refers to the Mexican army. 
"Army" and "military" will be used interchangeably throughout the chapter. The military as an 
20 
"Caribbean and Latin America." The Military Balance: 1994-1995. NY: Brassey's Inc., 1995, 
pp. 202-203. 
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institution "includes the bulk of the military organization - those who staff the bases and carry out 
their routine training cycles, manage the complex network of the military - schooling system, except 
intelligence, do the day-to-day work of a military bureaucracy, and are available as a strategic reserve 
if there is a major national 'emergency'. "21 
1. Review of the Literature 
A review of the literature suggests that most scholars are not satisfied with the available 
information on the Mexican military. Monica Serrano, David F. Ronfeldt, and L. N. McAlister argue 
that literature on the Mexican military is lacking?2 There are, however, a few similarities that most 
scholars employ when writing about the Mexican military. Most scientists trace the roots of the 
military to the Mexican Revolution; most scholars analyze the modifications made to the military by 
each president; and, most agree that after 1940 the Mexican military's role in society was civic action 
and crisis management. 
Edwin Lieuwen studies the Mexican armies of the revolutionary period. Lieuwen's 
contribution sets the framework for other scientists. His study ofMexico focuses on the changes 
within the military between 1910 and 1940.23 Lieu wen's additional chapter expands the years of his 
21 Stepan, Alfred. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 30. 
22 Serrano, Monica. "The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico." 
Journal ofLatin American Studies 27 (1995): 423. Ronfeldt, David F. "The Mexican Army and 
Political Order Since 1940." Armies and Politics in Latin America. Ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal. 
NY: Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976, pp. 294-5. Most of the first systematic writings on 
the military in Latin America were published in the 1960s. See McAlister, L. N. "Recent 
Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America." Latin American Research 
Review 2.1 (1966): 5-36. 
23 Lieuwen, Edwin. Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. 
Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico Press, 1968. 
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previous research and analyzes the depoliticization of the military between 1915 and 1950?4 
Lieuwen's works are widely cited in current articles. 
Rod eric A. Camp breaks new ground as he undertakes an empirical study of the Mexican 
military, the first - according to Camp - of its kind. Camp focuses on military history and civil-
military relations to explain the role of the army generals and why the military, since the revolution, 
has not intervened in politics. Indicators of his variables include composition, experience, 
background, and behavior of Mexican generals. Conclusions as to why the military no longer 
intervenes in politics are professionalism (specialized training of the armed forces) and the autonomy 
of the military to deal with military matters. 25 Like Lieuwen, Camp's masterpiece is often cited in 
articles on Mexico's military. 
Monica Serrano explores the relationship between society and the military institution in 
Mexico. Serrano explains the paradox of the pact that transferred power from the military to civilian 
control. Serrano's argument is that the pact subordinated the military to civilian rule yet ensures that 
the resort to violence by civilian authorities occurs within constitutional limits. She examines the 
roles of the military under former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and concludes that 
24 Lieuwen, Edwin. "Depoliticization ofthe Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1950." The 
Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment. Ed. David Ronfeldt. San Diego: University of 
California, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1984. 
25 Camp, Roderic Ai. Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico. NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
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civilian control, through professionalization and autonomy within the armed forces, prevented the 
military from reemerging as a strong political actor. 26 
In summary, Lieuwen provides the historical background of the Mexican military; Camp 
argues that the military has not intervened in politics because of the professionalization and autonomy 
ofthe military; and Serrano analyzes the conflict between civilian control of the military and the use 
of force by the military. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
During and after the Cold War, scholars suggested that one of the characteristics necessary 
for democracy was to subordinate the military to civilian control. One political scientist, Paul W. 
Zagorski, theorizes that "Civilian control ofthe armed forces is necessary for democracy."27 He 
posits that civilian control can be established only through military reform. Zagorski employs a 
comparative analysis on the internal dynamics28 of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and 
Uruguay) to analyze the issues relevant to civil-military relations. 
The argument of this chapter is that civilian control of the Mexican armed forces that has 
existed for 67 years will continue. In Mexico, any control over the military will not bring about 
26 Serrano, Monica, 1995, pp. 423-448. For other articles pertaining to the Mexican military see 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Nunn, Federick M. "The South 
American Military and (Re)Democratization: Professional Thought an Self-Perception." Journal 
oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 37.2 (1995): 1-56. Prewett, Virginia. "The Mexican 
Army." Foreign Affairs 1.3 (1941): 609-620. Ronfeldt, in Lowenthal, 1976. Wager, 1995. 
27 Zagorski, Paul W. Democracy vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 147. 
28 The internal dynamics Zagorski studies are human rights, internal security, military reform and 
reform of the state. 
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democracy if the PRI elites do not want democracy to occur. PRI elites will lose many existing 
benefits if the regime proceeds toward democracy. In the current regime, PRI elites maintain power 
over the military through a broad range of authoritarian practices. 29 Therefore, civilian control of 
the military is necessary, but not sufficient for democracy in Mexico. 
3. Methodology 
The puzzle of this chapter is: why is it that Mexico has a politically weak military, but no 
democracy? A case study of Mexico will be employed. The outcome (dependent) variable is 
democratization; the causal (independent) variable is civilian control of the military. Indicators of 
civilian control include military expenditures, numbers of military personnel in key positions, and the 
overall importance of the armed forces through civil-military relations. Mexico is a deviant case in 
that like other Latin American countries its military is subordinated to civilian control, but unlike 
other countries there is no democracy. 
Origins of the Mexican military derive from the country's independence in 1821. However, 
this chapter will focus on Mexico's military experiences of the twentieth century. The next section 
analyzes historical and current perspectives of the Mexican military from 1900 to 1996. 
B. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
1. Historical Perspectives- The Mexican Revolutionary Period: 1900-1940 
McAlister analyzes four paradigms to describe military interactions with the civilian 
population in Latin America. Of the four, three are relevant to twentieth-century Mexico: the 
29 For more on Mexican elites, see Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther, and John Higley. "Elites 
and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview." Elites and 
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Ed. John Higley and Richard 
Gunther. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 323-325. 
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gendarmist state, the praetorian state, and the civilist state. In a gendarmist state, a single actor 
emerges as the head of the state. The gendarmist state best explains Mexico's civil-military relations 
from 1900 to 1910 under the dictatorship of General Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910). "In a gendarmist 
state a single individual, generally but not always a military man, uses a mercenary army to make 
himself master of the state, imposes social and political order, tames the army and uses it as a 
[national police force] to maintain himself in power." 30 
In a praetorian state, there are frequent coups. The praetorian state best characterizes Mexico 
during the Revolutionary years (1910-1924) in which the presidency changed between military and 
civilian rule. Zagorski adds that "while praetorianism is too unnuanced to serve as a complete 
description of the Latin American political tradition it delineates a pattern of political behavior that 
has plagued much ofthe region."31 Finally, in a civilist state, there is civilian control of the military. 
The civilist state best explains Mexico's civil-military relations since the 1920s. The civilist state is 
"characterized by civil supremacy over the military and exists in relatively stable societies with 
professionalized armed forces."32 The fourth paradigm, not evidenced in Mexico, is the garrison state 
in which the military dominates the state and attempts to militarize the societies. 
Mexico entered the twentieth century under the dictatorship ofDiaz who initially filled senior 
administrative positions with prominent military officers. Having learned that military officers lacked 
expertise in politics, Diaz replaced the officers with professional bureaucrats. Three lessons were 
30 McAlister, L.N. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America." Government and Politics in Latin 
America. Ed. Peter G. Snow. NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1967, pp. 280-281. 
31 Zagorski, 1992, p. 4. 
32 McAlister, 1967, p. 281. 
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learned. First, "Military officers must form an alliance with civilian sympathizers who have the skills 
and inclination to be politically active."33 Samuel P. Huntington argues that most military officers 
become involved in politics only out of personal and professional interests such as higher pay, 
increased benefits, distribution of power and status, and increasing forces. 34 The experience required 
of cabinet-level positions far exceeds that of military officers who dabble in politics. 
Second, "Physically removing military officers from political office is a first step, however 
small, in conveying to the population, the political leadership, and the officer corps itself, that the 
political arena is the purview of civilians, not military men. "35 Third, Diaz created civilian loyalists, 
directly and indirectly, by employing professional-politicians in top jobs. Diaz became immersed in 
political matters and ignored the military. As a result, the army diminished from 35,000 in 1900 to 
20,000 in 1910.36 A decline in the military permitted an opportunity for other political aspirants to 
seek office. 
In 1911, a coup was staged and Francisco Madero overthrew Diaz. Madero, a civilian 
activist, initiated the Mexican Revolution by leading similar wealthy individuals who were denied 
political opportunities under Diaz?7 While a presidential candidate, Madero openly contested 
militarism through the publication of Sucesion Presidencial en 1910.38 Madero's Plan of San Luis 
33 Camp, 1992, p. 16. 
34 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968, p. 194. 
35 Camp, 1992, p. 16. 
36 Camp, 1992, p. 16. 
37 Lieuwen, Edwin. Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. 
Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico Press, 1968, p. 6. 
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Potosi was an antimilitaristic pronouncement that stated the rule of the generals would have to end 
before democracy would come to Mexico. 39 Madero established a revolutionary army (the Ejercito 
Libertador) to fight the Mexican regular armed forces (Federal Army) under Diaz. 
By 1911, the Federal Army totaled 28,000.40 In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta and the 
Federal Army initiated a coup and brought down the Madero regime. One year later General 
Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist Army defeated Huerta's army. Between 1914 and 1915, 
three revolutionary generals unsuccessfully intervened to overthrow Carranza: Pancho Villa, 
Emiliano Zapata, and Alvaro Obregon. In 1916, Carranza called for an election of 221 delegates to 
write a new constitution. Federal Army officers and "Villistas" were excluded from the election. As 
a result, only 45 military officers were elected to assist with the new legislation. The 1917 Mexican 
Constitution, the first since the Revolution, was a watershed mark in that it was initiated by an army· 
general and drafted by civilians.41 
Preparations for the 1920 elections increased violence as revolutionary generals were 
concerned that a civilian would lead the country. General Obregon ended the speculation when he 
appointed himself as the president. Two weeks after his election, Obregon was assassinated and 
General Plutarco Elias Calles assumed t~e presidency. General Calles accomplished three major feats 
~!Translated,., the title is the Presidential Succession in 1910. Lieuwen, 1968, p. 7. 
Lteuwen, I96~, p. 8. 
40 16,000 were part ofthe Mexican Federal Army and 12,000 came from Madero's Ejercito 
Libertador. Lieuwen, 1968, p. 13. 
41 Lieuwen, 1968, p.41. 
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before tenninating office. First, Calles further institutionalized the military by approving a set of laws 
that stated the military's mission, promotion procedures, discipline, and retirement benefits. 42 
Second, backed by the elite settlement, Calles created a political pact in 1928 to peacefully 
transfer power from the military generals to the civilian political elite.43 The pact "demilitarized 
political competition, but restricted the arena of competition to the new party."44 Finally, Calles 
founded the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), the organization to promote a formal peaceful 
political succession to the presidency. Calles stepped down, but not before naming his successors: 
"Left -leaning" lawyer Portes Gil ( 1928-1930), General Pascual Ortiz Rubio ( 193 0-193 2 ), and General 
Abelardo Rodriquez (1932-1934). These presidents made no major changes to the military. 
In 1934, Lazaro Cardenas was elected to the presidency. To reorganize the army and 
subordinate it to politics, Cardenas devised the Plan Sexenio Militar. The plan had two goals: to 
further professionalize the army and to institutionalize the political participation of the military.45 
More important, Cardenas brought the army closer to the people and the people closer to the army 
by making civilians more appreciative of the military role. The army was exposed to the civil sector 
as manpower to construct buildings, to beautifY cities, and to perform as teachers. 46 
42 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 87. 
43 Alan Knight provides a thick description of elite settlements. See Knight, Alan. "Mexico's 
Elite Settlement: Conjuncture and Consequences." Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin 
America and Southern Europe. Ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp. 113-145. 
44 Serrano, pp. 431-432. 
45 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 118. 
46 Lieuwen, 1968, pp. 120-121. 
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In 1938, Cardenas created the Party ofthe Mexican Revolution (PRM) which included four 
sectors: labor (Confederation ofMexican Workers-CTM), peasant (National Peasant Confederation-
CNC), popular (National Confederation of Popular Organization-CNOP), and the military. The 
purpose for bringing in the military was not to politicize it, but to ensure the military played a minor 
political role in the process of presidential successions. 
Mexico's Revolutionary period ended with the election of General Avila Camacho in 1940. 
Under President Camacho ( 1940-1946), the military influence was greatly reduced because the elite-
class was in its final states of consolidating control of the military.47 To keep the military from 
gaining political strength, President Camacho eliminated the military as a sector from the PRM and 
folded it into the popular sector. Less one sector, the PRM was renamed the Institutional 
Revolutionary party (PRI). 
From 1900 to 1940 Mexico experienced a violent transition of leadership between civilian 
and military rule. The military experienced drastic manpower cuts, increased professionalism, and 
decreased political power. Clearly, the end of the Revolutionary period resulted in the military being 
subordinated to civilian leadership. Table 1 summarizes the decline in military percentages of the 
total budget from 1914 to 1940. 
47 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 143. 
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Table 1 -Mexican Presidents and the Status ofthe Military Between 1914 and 1940 
Total Military Mil Percentage 
Year President Budget Budget of Total Budget 
1914 Gen Venustiano Carranza 141 44 31 
1920 Gen Plutarco Elias Calles 213 132 65 
1928 Portes Gil 291 97 33 
1930 Ortiz Rubio 294 93 32 
1932 Abelardo Rodriquez 227 61 27 
1934 Lazaro Cardenas 243 61 25 
1940 Gen Avila Camacho 449 94 21 
The total budget and military budget are represented in millions of pesos. The military budget 
includes Defense Ministry appropriation plus those for the Military Factories. 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda, Memoria y Cuenta, 1914-1940 in Lieuwen, 1968, p. 153. 
In Table 1, the largest amount of the military budget and the military percentage of the budget 
occurred in 1920 as more funds were allocated to improve military professionalism. Calles further 
professionalized the military but with fewer funds. Generally, a decline in military percentages of the 
budget represents the strengthening of civilian control over the military. 
In summary, by the end of the Revolutionary period the military confined its political activity 
to nonviolent competition and bargaining within an institutionalized decision making political party 
clearly dominated by civilian elites. The Revolutionary period also marked the last of Mexico's 
military's officers who served as presidents. 
2. Current Perspectives- The Mexican Post-Revolutionary Period: 1946-1996 
Revolutionary events that rocked Mexico during the first half of the century abated after 1946. 
During the post-Revolutionary era, the military endstrength dwindled from its revolutionary numbers 
and its role in politics grew silent. Miguel Aleman ushered in the second half of the century by 
winning the 1946 election. Aleman was Mexico's first elected president who secured civilian 
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supremacy over the armed forces by allocating seven percent of the total budget to military 
expenditures. 48 Succeeding presidents reduced the political activism of the military by encouraging 
military professionalism while decreasing military expenditures. Although the military's occupation 
of top positions in public offices declined, the president traditionally appointed a military man to serve 
as the PRI chairman. 49 
Table 2 lists Mexican presidents who were elected since 1946 and the corresponding status 
ofthe military. 
Table 2 - Mexican Presidents and the Status of the Military Between 1946 and 1994 
Armed Forces 
Year President ME/GNP Endstrength Per 100 People 
1946 Miguel Aleman N/A N/A N/A 
1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines N/A N/A N/A 
1958 Adolfo Lopez Mateos N/A N/A N/A 
1964 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz .7 65 1.57 
1970 Luis Echeverria Alvarez .7 80 1.53 
1976 Jose Lopez Portillo .7 100 1.7 
1982 Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado .5 120 1.6 
1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari .6 154 1.9 
1994 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon N/A N/A N/A 
Sources: Statistics for 1964 and 1970 are from the World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 
1963-1973. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C., p. 46. Statistics for 
197 6 and 1982 are from the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1985. U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C., p. 73. Statistics for 1988 are from the World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1993-1994. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
Washington, D.C., p. 74. 
48 Meyer, Michael C. and William L. Sherman. The Course ofMexican History. 5th ed. NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 640. 
49 Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 253, fn17. 
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Table 2 includes percentages of military expenditures (ME) of the gross national product (GNP) for 
that year, the endstrength in thousands, and the percentages of the armed forces per 1000 people. 
The evidence shows that military expenditures in the latter half of the century have steadily decreased; 
the endstrength has more than doubled since 1964; and, the more people are joining the military. 
Although more people are enrolling in Mexico's military, civilian control is demonstrated through 
fewer resources allocated to the military. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 is impossible because of 
the lack of single source data from the beginning of the century to the present. 
a. The Mission and Roles of the Mexican Military 
The Constitution of 1917 and the 1926 Organic Law set forth the Mexican army's 
mission of today which is "to defend the integrity and independence of the nation, to maintain the 
Constitution, and to pressure internal order."50 The mission has remained unchanged, but the roles 
have significantly changed. These changes are relevant because as the roles of the military become 
important so do its significance. 
Virginia Prewett studied the Mexican Army in its role after the Revolution. She learned that 
the Mexican military was employed as construction workers, road builders, and beautifiers of towns. 51 
Similarly, Ronfeldt lists some achievements of the Mexican army employed as a domestic police 
rather than a defense force. The army's notable policing accomplishments include suppressing the 
1968 student-based riots in Mexico City's Tlatelolco Square, subduing electoral disturbances, 
50 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 87. 
51 Prewett, Virginia. "The Mexican Army." Foreign Affairs 1.3 (1941): 616. 
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quelling labor and industrial disturbances, combating guerrilla insurgencies, and hunting down cattle's 
rustlers and bandits in the rural areas. 52 
According to Andrew Reding, other roles of the Mexican military have included 
"kidnapp[ing] suspected dissidents, hundreds of whom were never heard from again ... [and] in the 
early 1970s ... crush[ing] a peasant rebellion in the state of Guerrero with a scorched-earth policy 
that made little distinction between combatants and civilians."53 As a result of the 1994 Chiapas 
rebellion the military has reformed its organization and modified its roles to "fight against insurgents 
and the fight against drugs."54 The military mission remains constant, the roles are changing, but 
Mexico's military is still internally focused. 
To summarize this section, the end of the Mexican Revolutionary period initiated the 
decline of the military's involvement in politics and control of civilian authority through limiting the 
amount of funds distributed to the military. In 1920, the military percentage of the total budget was 
65 percent. By 1940, the military was allocated only 21 percent of the budget. The civilianization of 
political power through the creation of the PRI eliminated the military's direct role in political 
decision making. 
During the Post-Revolutionary period, the funds allocated to the military further 
decreased as more of the population joined the armed services. By 1988, the military received only 
52 Ronfeldt in Lowenthal, 1976, pp. 292-294. 
53 Reding, Andrew. "Chiapas is Mexico: The Imperative ofPolitical Reform." World Policy 
Journal 11.1 (1994): 19. 
54 Rodriquez Reyna, Ignacio. "The Enemy Is Also Within: The Army ofRangers and Green 
Berets." Trans text. Mexico City: El Financiero, Sep 25, 1995, pp. 42-44 in Document Outlines 
Reorganization of Army, FBIS-LAT -95-193. 
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.6 percent of the budget. President Aleman secured the civilian control of the military with his 
election in 1946. Succeeding presidents lacked the "experience of the Revolution" but were aware 
of the consequences of military involvement in politics. This section referred to civilian control of 
the military throughout the century. The next section analyzes the types of civilian control employed 
in Mexico. 
C. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
As of 1996, all Latin American militaries are subordinated to civilian rulers. Huntington posits 
two varieties of civilian control of the military that will be analyzed within the framework of Mexico: 
subjective and objective. 55 
1. Subjective Civilian Control 
Subjective civilian control of the military decreases the power of the military by promoting 
the interests of civilian groups. The leadership has three means of maximizing civilian power. The 
first is by government institution. In Mexico, this has occurred by increasing the power of the 
Congress while maintaining the relative influence ofthe military. Mexico's government is highly 
centralized as the president controls the legislative and judicial branches of government. 
The second means of increasing civilian power is through constitutional reform. "Civilian 
control is identified with [a] democratic government, military control with absolute or totalitarian 
government."56 By definition, Mexico's semi-democratic regime does not fit this definition of 
increased civilian power over the military. However, in Argentina, President Raul Alfonsin controlled 
55 Huntington, 1957, pp. 80-85. 
56 Huntington, 1957, p. 82. 
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the military by placing civilians in key positions over the military: Secretary of Defense, Director of 
the National Defense School, and the senior intelligence gathering agency. In Uruguay, a civilian 
heads the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Congress reviews the military budget as submitted by the 
MoD and if there are budgetary questions, the Congress summons the MoD. 57 
Finally, civilian control can be maximized by social class. After the Revolution in Mexico, 
elites consolidated their power to control the military. Between 1934 and 1940, the elites further 
controlled the military as a sector of the PRI. By 1946, the military was excluded from the PRI but 
still under the control of the Mexican oligarchy. Elite control of the military resulted in increased 
autonomy and professionalism of the military. In summary, Mexico's military was subjectively 
controlled by government institution and the elite class. 
2. Objective Civilian Control 
The second variety of civilian control is objective. Huntington argues that objective civilian 
control is preferred to subjective control. Objective civilian control is "militariz[ing] the military [by] 
making them the tool of the state."58 
Objective civilian control involves 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition 
by military officer of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination 
of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and 
military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by the leadership of an area of professional 
competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military 
intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. 59 
57 Stepan, 1988, pp. 87-90. 
58 Huntington, 1957, p. 83. 
59 Huntington, Samuel P. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations." Journal ofDemocracy 6.4 
(1995): 9-10. 
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The intent of objective civilian control is to provide the military with more institutional autonomy, 
more professional training, and less political involvement. 
a. Military Autonomy 
According to David Pion-Berlin, military autonomy refers "broadly to the relative 
independence with which the armed forces behave ... [and] the institutional and political dimensions 
to the military's behavior."60 He studied the autonomy ofthe postauthoritarian armed forces in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru to determine the degree to which the military is willing 
and able to defend perceived prerogatives by decision site. 61 Pion-Berlin found that the armed forces 
in all countries succeeded in protecting professional (core) functions that are central to the institution. 
Countries were less successful in protecting political (periphery) functions. 62 
In Mexico, the military, too, is highly autonomous in professional issues and less so 
in political involvement. The Mexican Army and Air Force Development Plan calls for the first 
unprecedented reorganization of the army and air force in 61 years. While the military downplays the 
reform as "nothing spectacular," some civilian strategists believe otherwise. Guillermo Garduno, a 
military strategy expert, says, "thanks to the [reform], the army will become the most modern public 
administration sector that will have a very broad and sophisticated information network capable of 
60 Pion-Berlin, David. "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America." 
Comparative Politics 25 .1 ( 1992): 84. 
61 Decision sites includes personnel decisions, force levels, education, doctrine, reform, budget, 
arms production and procurement, defense organization, intelligence gathering, internal security, 
and human rights. 
62 The professional functions, the core, include junior-level decision-making, military doctrine, 
military education, and military reform. Political functions, the periphery, include human rights 
and internal security. The remaining decision sites were found inconclusive and classified as 
professional-political. 
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going anywhere." Garduno adds that "With a weak president like the one we now have, [President 
Zedillo] could become hostage of the armed forces." 63 By contrast, Brazil's modernization plans that 
included new equipment and force restructuring under the first two years of civilian rule "did not 
cause any significant conflict with the new civilian government because military expenditures were 
low." The military designed the plans and Congress accepted them without argument. 64 
Post-Revolutionary presidents allowed the military great autonomy. An unwritten rule 
was that no civilian was allowed to criticize the military either in speech or print. Now, the military 
roles are at the forefront of public debate. The military has gone public with refusal to become 
involved with future demonstrations and encouraging participation in civilian decisions concerning 
employment of the military. 65 In summary, there are some signs of growing autonomy (such as a 
reorganization plan) and weakening autonomy (such as the reappearance of military issues in national-
debate). 
b. Military Professional Training 
The Mexican Development Plan supports the civilian control of the military through 
professionalism. Throughout the twentieth-century, numerous "isms" have described the Mexican 
military's involvement with civil society. First there was caudillism, militarism, then professionalism. 
Caudillism was the ideology of a dictator as displayed by Diaz.66 According to McAlister, militarism 
63 Rodriguez Reyna, Sep 25, 1995, FBIS-LAT-95-193. 
64 Stepan, 1988, p. 88. 
65 
"Another Item on Zedillo's 'Must Do' List: Reforms Needed." Mexico and NAFTA Report 
RM-94-11, Nov 3, 1994, p. 6. 
66 Caudillos are "military men interested in maintaining power, maximizing personal gain, and 
defeating rivals." Rossi, Ernest E. and Jack C. Plano. Latin America: A Political Dictionary. 
Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1992, pp. 110-111. 
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was associated with all forms of organized violence employed to meet political ends. It not only 
classified institutional action of the armed forces with that of savages but concentrated on the 
spectacular manifestations of military political action as exemplified by military caudillos. The two 
drawbacks of militarism were that it "glorified war and emphasized strong imperialist overtones. It 
did not cover instances in which armed forces have been nonpolitical. "67 
Moving from militarism to professionalism, Federick M. Nunn offers professional 
militarism as a representation of authoritarianism. Once the armed militants occupied the presidencies 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, they offered no improved solutions to national problems than 
the civilians. 68 Although the account of militarism seems controversial, it is clearly an appropriate 
ideology for Mexico's revolutionary turmoil. With the end of the Revolution, militarism was 
replaced with professionalism. 
Several examples demonstrate how specialized training increases objective civilian 
control of the military. Under Diaz, top lieutenants and captains attended military academies in Spain, 
Italy, and the United States. Mexican officers, schooled abroad, who returned to Mexico initiated 
military programs without foreign assistance. 69 "In 1951 the [United States] offered mutual defense 
assistance pacts to eight Latin American nations under which they were to receive military assistance 
67 McAlister, L. N. "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America." 
Latin American Research Review 2.1 ( 1966): 5. 
68 Nunn, 1995, pp. 2-5. 
69 Camp, 1992, pp. 56-57. 
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in exchange for assuming hemisphere defense responsibilities. Although Mexico's armed forces 
welcomed the offer, the civilian dominated administration ofMiguel Aleman refused."70 
Professional standards initiated by President Calles included: testing officers, 
abolishing political involvement of the military, and introducing standards of conduct. By improving 
the professional training, young military officers were exposed to discipline, subordinated to civilian 
control, and discouraged from engaging in political matters. In summary, the Mexican military is 
indeed a professional force. Mexico's military does have standards of conduct and there are service 
academies to train officers at all levels of rank. Furthermore, the military has survived the control of 
civilian rulers and it is extremely autonomous in military matters. 
c. Military Depoliticization 
Depoliticization is de-emphasizing political appetites of the military through a variety 
of ways. Mexican presidents galvanized depoliticization in various ways: frequent transfers of 
military zone commanders,71 offering incentives for staying out of politics, and strongly discouraging 
the military from becoming involved in politics. Military zone commanders were frequently 
transferred to prevent them from building up large personal following of troops and local politicians.72 
Another way of depoliticizing the Mexican military was removing it as a sector from the PRI. 
70 Lieuwen, Edwin. "Depolitization of the Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1950," in The 
Modem Mexican Military: A Reassessment. Ed. David Ronfeldt. San Diego: University of 
California, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1984, p, 61. 
71 Each state in Mexico is divided into zones. Some states, such as Chihuahua, Jalisco and 
Guerreo are divided into two zones. As of September 1995 Mexico had 36 military zones. 
Rodriguez Reyna, Sep 25, 1995, FBIS-LAT-95-193. 
72 Cornelius, Wayne A. and Ann Craig. The Mexican Political System in Transition. San Diego: 
University of California, Center for Mexican Studies, 1991, p. 92. 
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Camp offers convincing evidence that since the Diaz regime, the number of military 
office holders has steadily, and in some cases, drastically declined. Table 3 shows the percentages 
of Mexican military officers by administration. 
Table 3 -Percentages ofMexican Military Officeholders by Administration 1900-1988 
Year Percentage Year Percentage 
1900 30 1935 27 
1911 24 1940 19 
1913 50 1946 8 
1914 46 1952 14 
1920 40 1958 15 
1924 34 1964 7 
1928 29 1970 10 
1930 32 1976 6 
1932 33 1982 5 
Source: Camp, 1992, p. 67. 
In 1900, under a dictator, military officers held 30 percent of the jobs. Percentages for the 1913 
regime are unusually high because both Madero and Huerta were battling for the presidency. Since 
then, the percentages have steadily declined. In the 1990s, military officers hold fewer than [two] 
percent of all important political jobs. 73 
In summary, an application ofHuntington's definition of objective civilian control of 
the Mexican military shows that 1) there is a high level of professionalism and military officers know 
not to overstep their limits and intervene in politics; 2) without a doubt the military is under the 
control ofPresident Zedillo; 3) the military has its autonomy in that the senior military leadership 
73 Camp, 1992, pp. 68-69. 
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selects who may join and become promoted; and 4) the military has not overtly intervened in politics 
nor have the politicians interceded in military affairs. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
The subordination of the Mexican military to civilian leadership and the roles of the military 
as maintainers of the status quo have led to unprecedented but tense civil-military relations with 
complicated implications and threats to democratization. The role of the military as a civil force 
poses inconsistencies between definitions of civil-military relations. On the one hand the military 
unquestionably executes the orders of the President; on the other hand the military utilizes force 
commensurate with its mission. One example of this paradox is the January 1, 1994 Chiapas uprising 
that caught the civilian leadership in Mexico by surprise. 74 Three days after the offensive and the 
military's response with overwhelming force, 75 President Salinas ordered a halt to the massacre in. 
exchange for "unity among civilians to confront the nation's problems."76 The military's use of 
excessive force attracted scrutiny from domestic and international human rights activists. 
The alleged violations committed by the Mexican military were brutal and to date the debate 
still lingers as to who was at fault. Civilian authorities have yet to prosecute anyone for the abuses 
74 The January 1, 1994 Chiapas uprising was the result of the Indians in Mexico's poorest state, 
Chiapas, to draw attention to their plight ofloss ofland and economic misery. After the Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN) captured four towns (San Cristobal de las Casas, Ocosingo, 
Las Margaritas, and Altamirano) the army was called upon to suppress the rebellion. For more 
on the rebellion see Collier, George A. and Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello. Basta! Land and the 
Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas. Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994. 
75 The military troops numbered about 12,000 versus 1,000 peasants. The military was supported 
by artillery, armor, helicopters, and airplanes. Montes, Julio. "Mexican Revolution-1994 Style." 
Jane's Intelligence Review. 6.3 (1994): 138. 
76 Darling, Junita. "Toll Tops 100 in Mexican Rebellion." Los Angeles Times. NEXIS. On-line. 
Jan 4, 1994. 
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that occurred in Chiapas. Examples of excessive force and violations of human rights by the Mexican 
army include: torturing women and children, severing human appendages; 77 killing and injuring 
unarmed residents; shooting men point-blank when their wrists were bound; illegally detaining 
residents; raping women; and firing on journalists who clearly displayed a white flag. 78 Reports by 
Amnesty International and Americas Watch have also accused the military of torturing indigenous 
peoples in Chiapas. 79 
Accusations of human rights abuses suggest implications for relations between civil society 
and the military, political leaders and the military, and within the military. Relations between civil 
society and the military only worsened after the Chiapas massacre. The army lived up to its 
reputation of a brutal repressive force against unarmed civilians. Just as the army did during the 
Revolution and the 1968 student demonstrations, the Chiapas rebellion forced the army to take up 
arms against the people. 
In Mexico, strained relations between civil society and the military are not favorable 
conditions for democratization. As the civilian leader, the use ofthe military as a civil means is a 
president's prerogative. In Mexico, the military is employed as maintainers ofthe status quo. In 
Uruguay in 1996, the president used the military as a threat to quell a prison revolt. Instead of using 
77 These are the accounts of rebel leaders who signed a commique denouncing the Mexican army. 
Darling, Junita. "Army Actions Raise Fears for Chiapas Rights." Los Angeles Times. NEXIS. 
On-line. Feb 14, 1995. 
78 U.S. Dept of State. "Mexico Human Rights Practices, 1994." Department of State Dispatch. 
Netscape. On-line. March 1995. 
79 Fraser, Damian. "Peasant Army Embarrasses Mexico: The Insurrection in Chiapas May Alter 
Government Policy." Financial Times. NEXIS. On-line. Jan 5, 1994. 
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manpower, the government "unfolded an impressive display of military firepower outside the prison 
[to warn] rebellious inmates of what could be in store for them. "80 
In Guatemala, former defense minister Hector Gramajo Morales is credited with bringing 
democracy to the country. Some of his initiatives include sending officers to seminars that espouse 
how the military benefits in a democracy. Guatemalan soldiers also participate in local soccer 
leagues, award ceremonies at schools, and encourage plantation owners to pay workers at least 
minimum wages. The Guatemalans respect neither Gramajo nor the army because of the repressive 
activities demonstrated against the insurgents. The military's subordination to civilian rule in 
Guatemala will continue because the military presence alone "unnerves a community still suffering 
a sort of collective post-traumatic stress syndrome" and most Guatemalans "do not believe in military 
people. "81 
In an unsurprising move, President Zedillo, in June 1996, named Army Brigadier General 
Enrique Salgado Cardero as Mexico City's top policeman. As the seventh army general to hold the 
position since 1958, Salgado swore in "[eleven] army generals and [nine] colonels each ofwhom 
brought with them teams of military advisors. "82 The unprecedented move of generals and colonels 
in top-level civil affairs positions led onlookers to speculate how soon the military might regain its 
foothold in politics. 
80 Blixen, Samuel. "Army Looks Inward." Latinamerica Press 28.16, May 2, 1996, p. 2. 
81 Wilkinson, Daniel. '"Democracy' Comes to Guatemala." World Policy Journal 12.4 (Winter 
1995/1996): 71-81. 
82 Dillon, Sam. "Army Officers to Fill Top Police Posts in Mexico City." New York Times. 
Netscape. On-line. Jun 19, 1996. 
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In early July 1996, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), an armed group in Guerrero, 
Mexico, emerged and began shooting automatic rifles. Rather than sending the police to quell the 
disturbance of dozens of peasant farmers, the government deployed hundreds of heavily armed 
soldiers, helicopters, and tanks to find the guerrillas. 83 Although the crisis is in its infancy, the 
Mexican military is being scrutinized like it was in 1994 during the Chiapas uprising. 
E. CONCLUSION: CIVILIAN CONTROL AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter was to analyze the impact of Mexican civilian 
control of the military on democratization. The Mexican Revolution set the framework for current 
relations between a civilian ruler and the military institution. Traditionally, military generals claimed 
the presidency by initiating coups. The post-Revolutionary years witnessed the decline of the 
military's role in politics. Since 1940 and through a series of "controls," Mexican presidents have 
asserted their power over the military. The controls, however, have failed to produce democratization 
in Mexico. 
The evidence is clear that both subjective and objective controls of the military have been 
implemented in Mexico. Obviously, both "controls" have made a dramatic impact in Mexico to the 
extent that the military has not initiated any coups since the Revolution. Mexico's military today is 
highly professionalized, extremely autonomous, and greatly depoliticized. The future interest of the 
military in politics is still in doubt, especially with the increased presence of senior military officers 
performing in senior civil positions. 
83 Lloyd, Marion. "All Parties Decry ERP's Threat oflmpending War." The News. Netscape. 
On-line. Jul 4, 1996. 
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Throughout this chapter, the current status of the Mexican military vis-a-vis civilian elites 
appears contradictory. On the one hand, the military is subordinate to civilian control. On the other 
hand, the post-Chiapas military may constitute a threat to civilian control. 84 In Mexico, civilian 
control has been demonstrated quite effectively since the end of the Revolution. The reorganized 
military is not yet a threat to civilian control. Given more of a defense budget, the lack of civilian 
leadership to demonstrate control of the country, increased weaponry, and increased scope of civil 
responsibilities, the military could become a threat to civilian control. 
Zagorski theorized that civilian control of the armed forces is necessary for democracy. In 
a comparison of Chile and Mexico, Chile's military, after 16 years of authoritarian rule under General 
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-1990), is heavily involved in politics. In Chile, civilian control of the 
armed forces is necessary for democracy. In Mexico, the evidence is clear that civilian control may 
be necessary, but it is not sufficient for democracy. If civilian control was sufficient, observers would 
see democracy in Mexico based solely on civilian control of the military. However, civilian control 
alone does not bring about democracy. Other variables that could influence democracy include the 
fairness of the political party system and the power of external actors. Mexico's armed forces have 
been subordinated to civilian control since 1934. In Chile, the regime has been relatively unstable; 
in Mexico, the regime has remained stable. In Chile, there is democracy, in Mexico there is no 
democracy. 
Given the fact that the military is subordinated to a civilian ruler and lacks political 
involvement, why has Mexico has failed to democratize? A primary reason is because of the 
84 For more on the military's new professionalism see Stepan, Alfred. "The New Professionalism 
oflntemal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion," in Stepan, Alfred. Ed. Authoritarian Brazil. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 52. 
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authoritarian nature of the PRI elites. Elites have much to lose should the regime transition to 
democracy. As the situation now stands, the oligarchic PRI members employ the military for control 
of civil unrest. These measures have included quelling disturbances at election polls and intervening 
in armed uprisings. Should the country become democratic, PRI elites will lose some of their power 
to other social classes. Democracy for the elites means an end to employing the military as elites see 
fit. 
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ill. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of institutionalization of Mexico's 
political party system and draw some conclusions as to why institutionalization of the political 
party system has failed to bring about democracy in Mexico. The puzzle of this chapter is: why 
does Mexico not have a competitive political party system? This chapter argues that a single-party 
system has ruled Mexico because of a combination of characteristics that are inconsistent with 
political parties. The indicators include stability in the rules between interparty competition, stable 
roots in society, legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties subordinate to ambitious 
leaders. This chapter analyzes the historical background of the major political parties, the political 
party system, and the implication of an institutionalized party system for democracy in Mexico. 
Political party, political party system, and institutionalization of the political party system 
warrant a brief definition as each will be extensively utilized throughout the chapter. A political 
party is an "organization that seeks to win elections, to take control of the machinery of 
government, and to determine public policy."85 In Mexico the parties consist of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD), and the Labor Party (PT). 
Giovanni Sartori defines a political party system as "the relatedness of parties to each 
other, on how each party is a function ... of the other parties and reacts, competitively or 
85 Rossi, Ernest E. and Jack C. Plano. Latin America: A Political Dictionary. Santa Barbara: 
ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1992, p. 102. 
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otherwise, to other parties."86 Mexico's political party system includes the relationship among all 
officially recognized parties. Huntington defines institutionalization as 
The process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level 
of any political system can be defined by the adaptability [the more adaptable an 
organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and 
more rigid the lower it level of institutionalization], complexity [the more complicated the 
more institutionalized], autonomy [the extent to which political organizations and 
procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior], and 
coherence [the more coherent the more highly institutionalized, the greater the disunity the 
less institutionalized] of its organizations and procedures. 87 
Most scholars refer to Satori's definition of a political party system and Huntington's definition 
of institutionalization in their writings on the party system. Likewise, these definitions will be 
employed throughout this thesis. 
1. Review of the Theoretical Literature 
Ronald H. McDonald studies political party systems and finds common fundamental 
characteristics prevalent in Latin America. The first is that elites control the decision making 
processes and sustain the political parties. The second is that parties are shaped around the 
personalities of the existing leader. For example, in Mexico, Lazaro Cardenas is one exceptional 
leader who molded the PRJ. Cardenas fired his predecessor's cabinet-level administrators and 
closed profitable casinos to create an exemplary image of the party. 88 
86 Sartori, Giovanni. "The Party as a Whole." Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for 
Analysis. Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 44. 
87 Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Order and Political Decay." Political Order in Changing 
Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 12-22. 
88 McDonald, Ronald H. Party Systems and Elections in Latin America. Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971. 
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In other examples, the Revolutionary Party in Guatemala was formed around the 
personality ofMario Mendez Montenegro. After his death in 1965 Montenegro was succeeded 
by his brother, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, who lacked experience but drew on the personal 
characteristics of his brother and family. In addition, the Colorado Party in Uruguay was 
organized under the personality ofJose Batlle y Ordonez (1903-1901 and 1911-1915). The third 
characteristic is that parties are highly organized and support clear political visions. Examples 
given include Mexico's PRI, Uruguay's Blancos and Colorados, and Chile's Christian Democrats. 
McDonald categorizes party systems as either single-party dominant (where one party wins 
not less than 60 percent of the seats of a legislative party), two-party competitive (two parties 
receive not less than 40 percent of the legislative seats or more than 60 percent of the total seats), 
multi-party dominant (one party receives not less than 40 percent or more than 60 percent of the 
seats in a legislative body, and in which no additional party receives more than 40 percent of the 
seats), and multi-party loose (one in which there are three or more parties competing and no party 
receives more than 40 percent of the seats) systems. 89 Within these parameters, Mexico is a 
single-party dominant system. 
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully have edited an important book on political party 
systems of major Latin American countries. 90 In contrast to McDonald, Mainwaring and Scully 
classify party systems as either institutionalized, hegemonic, or inchoate. Institutionalized party 
89 McDonald, 1971, p. 19. 
90 Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in 
Latin America. Ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press: 1995. 
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systems meet four criteria: stability of rules exist between interparty competition, parties are 
rooted in society, major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties, 
and parties are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. 91 Examples of 
institutionalized party systems include Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and 
Argentina. 
Mainwaring and Scully consider Mexico and Paraguay hegemonic party systems. The 
fusion between the state and party dictates that social organizations "support and participate in 
the governing parties in order to have access to state resources. "92 Peru, Brazil, Bolivia and 
Ecuador are inchoate party systems because according to the criteria of institutionalization these 
countries are not fully institutionalized. 93 
In contrast to McDonald, Mainwaring, and Scully, Michael Coppedge compares the 
political systems in Mexico and Venezuela. Specifically, he examines the consequences of political 
systems on the personal and daily lives of citizens. Coppedge argues that competition between 
parties is important. Competition, he writes, helps improve relations between the government and 
opposition parties and "affords a greater potential for peaceful evolution of the political system. "94 
Jorge Alcocer V. focuses on the five major electoral reforms in Mexico between 1978 and 
1994 and argues that Mexico must implement yet another reform to become democratic. Alcocer 
91 Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, pp. 4-5. 
92 Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 14. 
93 Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 19. 
94 Coppedge, Michael. "Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why Competition 
Matters." Comparative Politics 25.3 (Apr 1993): 253-274. 
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V. further argues that Mexico's next electoral reform should be a reconfiguration of the party 
system - especially the PRD and the PRI because they are more enigmatic. The PAN, according 
to Alcocer V., is more stable and can easily adapt to the new reforms. 95 The major reforms, 
already implemented, are outlined in the Appendix. 
In summary, McDonald organizes party systems into four categories that consider 
legislative voting patterns; Mainwaring and Scully address the degree of institutionalization ofthe 
party system; Coppedge asserts that competitive party systems promote democracy; and Alcocer 
V. argues that Mexico must continue to revamp the party system if democracy is to occur. 
In analyzing Mexico's political party system, the most important document is the Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1917. Given that the Constitution is the supreme 
law, legislation is secondary to it and laws override all customs. The Constitution states: "It is the 
will of the Mexican people to organize themselves into a federal, democratic, representative 
Republic composed of free and sovereign states in all that concerns their internal affairs, but united 
in a Federation established according to the principles of this fundamentallaw."96 Article 41 of 
the 1917 Constitution pertains to political parties and states: 
The purpose of political parties is to promote the participation of the people in democratic 
activity, to contribute to forming the national representation as organizations of citizens, 
to make possible their access to the exercise of public power, in accordance with the 
95 Alcocer V., Jorge. "Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico: Prospects for a Real Multiparty 
Democracy." The Challenge oflnstitutional Reform in Mexico. Ed. Riordan Roett. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 57-75. 
96 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States Title II, Chapter 1, Article 40. 
Translated. Institute Federal Electoral, 1994. 
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programs, principles and ideas which they postulate and through universal, free, secret and 
direct suffrage. 97 
Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution are important because they direct the form of 
Mexican government and shape the framework of the party system. Mainwaring and Scully 
theorize that "An institutionalized party system, per se, does not automatically deliver or even 
facilitate most outcomes that are hopes a democracy will produce."98 In other words, because a 
political party system is institutionalized, there is no guarantee that democracy will occur. This 
chapter goes one step further to analyze how fair the political party system is. 
2. Methodology 
The puzzle of the thesis is: why has Mexico failed to become a full-fledged democracy? 
Specifically, the puzzle of this chapter is: why does Mexico not have a viable multi-party political 
system? The causal (independent) variable is the lack of an institutionalized party system. 
Indicators that determine the level of institutionalization include stability in the rules between party 
competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are 
not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. 99 One advantage of using the four 
indicators to measure the level of institutionalization of the political party system is that either all 
or none of the parties should meet the criteria. Any indication that some, but not all, of the 
parties adhering to the "rules" immediately determines an unfair or "uninstitutionalized"system. 
97 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States Title II, Chapter 1, Article 41. 
98 Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 21. 
99 These indicators are borrowed from Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, pp. 4-5. 
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B. POLITICAL PARTIES IN MEXICO 
This section examines the major political parties in Mexico by analyzing the background 
and voting patterns for each party. Key political parties in Mexico include the PRI, the PAN, the 
PRD, and the PT. The tables provided throughout this section should be read with skepticism as 
elections in Mexico are not considered free of fraud. 
1. The Institutional Revolutionary Party 
The predecessor of the PRI was the PNR, which evolved out of the Mexican Revolution 
and was created by President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) as a means to peacefully transfer 
presidential power. The PNR was a left-of-center party until the creation of the Revolutionary 
Party ofMexico (PRM) in 1940 by President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940). Key initiatives by 
Cardenas included the co-option and incorporation of opposition groups to form the "pillars of 
the regime." The composition of the PRM included the agrarian (peasant farmers), labor (urban 
workers), popular (teachers, businessmen, and intellectuals), and military sectors that formed the 
base of support. 
The PRM shifted more to the right but remained left-of-center as the party again changed 
its name to the PRI in 1946 and deleted the military sector. Today, the PRI is more "centered" 
than the three major opposition parties but demonstrates its revolutionary side when threats to 
the party become apparent. The three sectors are still incorporated under the PRI, but 
membership has fizzled as voters have become disgruntled and have opted to support other 
political parties and civil groups. 
Domestic dissatisfaction over socioeconomic failures and unfulfilled campaign promises 
are key reasons why PRI membership and presidential voting percentages have dwindled. 
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Percentages for congressional elections have remained surprisingly consistent. Table 4 shows 
results of presidential voting percentages and voter turnout. Table 5 shows the voting results of 
percentages for congressional elections. 
Table 4 - PRI Voting and Turnout Percentages for Mexican Presidential Elections: 
1934-1994 
Voting Percentages Percentages of 
for the PRI Turnout for 
Years Presidential Candidate Eligible Voters 
1934 98.2 53.6 
1940 93.9 57.5 
1946 77.9 42.6 
1952 74.3 57.9 
1958 90.4 49.4 
1964 88.8 54.1 
1970 83.3 63.9 
1976 93.6 59.6 
1982 71.0 66.1 
1988 50.7 49.4 
1994 48.77 77.7 
Sources: Percentages from 1934-1988 are from Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258. Percentages 
for 1994 are from "Too Good to be True? The PRI Over-eggs its Electoral Pudding." Mexico 
and NAFTA Report RM-94-09, Sep 29, 1994, p. 2. 
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Table 5 - PRJ Voting Percentages for Mexican Congressional Elections: 1946-1994 
Percentages Percentages 
for the PRI for the PRI 
Years Congressional Candidates Year Congressional Candidates 
1946 73.5 1973 77.4 
1949 93.9 1976 84.8 
1952 74.3 1979 74.0 
1955 89.9 1982 69.3 
1958 88.2 1985 68.1 
1961 90.2 1988 51.1 
1964 86.2 1991 61.5 
1967 83.3 1994 50.3 
1970 83.2 
Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188. 
In Table 4, voting percentages for the PRI candidates throughout the years have declined 
and voter turnouts have been inconsistent. In 1994, however, Mexican nationals arrived at polls 
in record numbers. The results clearly show that even though they voted, Mexican citizens 
wanted the PRI to remain in power as candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, from the PRI, 
earned almost 49 percent of all votes. Table 5, in comparison, reiterates the pattern of 
unpopularity and decline ofvotes for the PRI during and mid-way through the presidential terms. 
The results of 1988, 1991, and 1994 are puzzling. In 1988 the party earned 51.1 votes, in 1991 
the PRI votes increased to 61.5 percent, and in 1994 percentages tumbled to 50.3 percent- the 
lowest in the history of the PRI. 
2. The National Action Party 
The PAN was founded in 1939 primarily by Catholic students and businessmen. The 
students struggled against the socialist Left to promote its proclerical ideology; the private sector 
wanted to protect investments from the socialism of President Cardenas. After the Revolution, 
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religious members fought to restore the rights of the Church during the pre-Revolutionary era. 
Businessmen, lawyers, bankers, journalists, and industrialists, protested against the nationalization 
of resources and formed to PAN to voice their disagreement. 100 
By 1946 and with the election of President Aleman, a staunch conservative, PAN 
businessmen shifted their allegiance to the PRJ. After President Miguel de Ia Madrid Hurtado 
nationalized the banks in 1982, most businessmen returned to the PAN, where they have remained. 
PAN supporters, since the 1950s, have focused on democratizing Mexico. Unlike the PRJ, the 
PAN selects its presidential candidate democratically. There is competition within the party and 
leaders are selected in an open and pluralistic manner. 
The PAN is the most representative political party in that its primary constituents are 
middle and lower-middle class urban citizens while the party also attracts support from 
conservative peasants. Generally and geographically, the PAN draws its base of support from the 
northern border states (especially Baja California Norte, Jalisco, and Guanajuato) Yucatan, and 
Mexico City. In 1946, the PAN won four seats in the Chamber ofDeputies and for each 
subsequent election has increased its representation. Ernesto Ruffo, a PAN candidate, won the 
governorship of Baja California Norte in 1988. In 1991, the PAN won its first Senate seat also 
from Baja California Norte. 
Examples of political "firsts" for the PAN do not undermine the image of the PRJ and the 
absence of democracy in Mexico. Under the PRJ rule, PAN members are represented, although 
100 Story, Dale. "The PAN, the Private Sector, and the Future of the Mexican Opposition." 
Mexican Politics in Transition. Ed. Judith Gentleman. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 
261-267. 
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inadequately, in high-level government positions. In addition to the PAN governorship in Baja 
California Norte, PAN members now control governorships in Jalisco (1994) Guanajuato (1994), 
Baja California Norte (since 1989), San Luis Potosi (1988) and Chihuahua (1992). 101 As of 
October 1996, Antonio Lozano Gracia, Mexico's Attorney General holds the most senior position 
as a PAN member in the Zedillo administration. 
As PRI voting percentages decline, the PAN is capitalizing on the PRI' s losses. Table 6 
shows the PAN voting and turnout percentages during the national elections since 1952, the first 
year the party decided to run a candidate against the PRI. Table 7 shows the percentages of 
Mexicans who voted for the PAN during congressional elections since 1946. 
Table 6 - PAN Voting and Turnout Percentages for Mexican Presidential Elections: 
1952-1994 
Voting Percentages Percentages of 
for the Turnout for 
Years PAN Presidential Candidate Eligible Voters 
1952 7.8 57.9 
1958 9.4 49.4 
1964 11.1 54.1 
1970 13.9 63.9 
1976 N/A 59.6 
1982 15.7 66.1 
1988 16.8 49.4 
1994 26.0 77.7 
Sources: Percentages from 1934-1988 are from Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258. Percentages 
for 1994 are from the U.S. Dept of State. "Background Notes: Mexico, May 1996." NEXIS. 
On-line. May 1996. 
101 
"All Change for the PRI: More Regional after Zedillo's Endorsement ofMadrazo." Mexico 
and NAFTA Report MR-95-06, Jun 15, 1995, p. 2. 
53 
Table 7 - PAN Voting Percentages for Mexican Congressional Elections: 1946-1994 
Voting Percentages Voting Percentages 
for the PAN for the PAN 
Years Congressional Candidates Years Congressional Candidates 
1946 2.2 1973 16.3 
1949 5.6 1976 9.0 
1952 8.7 1979 11.5 
1955 9.2 1982 17.5 
1958 10.2 1985 16.3 
1961 7.6 1988 18.0 
1964 11.5 1991 17.7 
1967 12.3 1994 25.8 
1970 14.2 
Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188. 
An analysis of Table 6 shows that since 1952, more Mexican nationals have favored the 
PAN for each subsequent election. Moreover, the 1994 numbers indicate that the PAN captured 
its highest percentages ever. Table 7, likewise, underscores the significant gains made by the PAN 
during midterm elections. During the 1994 election, the PAN captured one quarter of the 
available congressional votes. A comparison ofthe PRI and PAN voting percentages (Tables 4 
and 6, respectively) shows that the losses ofthe PRI were gains ofthe PAN. More importantly, 
the comparison ofthe 1994 congressional results between the PRJ and the PAN (Tables 5 and 
7, respectively), clearly indicates that the PAN drew votes from the PRJ. 
3. The Democratic Revolutionary Party 
The PRD is currently the major party of the Left and has undergone numerous name and 
structural changes under one leader, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Solorzano, the son of President 
Cardenas (1934-1940). For the 1988 national and congressional elections the major party of the 
Left was the Democratic National Front (FDN). The FDN was established for the purposes of 
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fanning one left-of-center political party, running one presidential candidate, and winning the 1994 
presidential election. The coalition consisted of four parties: the Democratic Current (DC), 102 the 
Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolutionary (P ARM), and 
the Party of the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction (PFCRN). 103 
The FDN was a significant contender for the Mexican presidency during the 1988 election, 
but has since suffered internal turmoil and loss of confidence from voters. As a result, the PRD 
was formally established in May 1989. The radical pattern of parties splitting, allying, and losing 
legal registration makes it difficult to show voting patterns for major parties of the Left. 
However, the results of the 1988 national election voting percentage for the FDN beg attention 
as it attracted 31.1 percent of the votes, 104 the highest ever for any party of the Mexican Left. In 
the 1994 national election the newly formed PRD, having split from the FDN, earned only 16.5 
percent of the votes. 105 Percentages of voter turnouts for 1988 and 1994 elections were 49.4 and 
77.7, respectively. 106 
102 The DC was headed by former Mexican Presidents Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo. 
103 Reding, Andrew. "Mexico's Democratic Current: Interview with Ifigenia Martinez." World 
Policy Journal 5.2 (Spr 1988): 349-350. 
104 Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258. 
105 Mexico and NAFTA Report Sep 29, 1994, p. 2. 
106 Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258. 
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Table 8 shows voting percentages for congressional elections for the left. 














Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188. 
Results for 1982 and 1985 are shown as a benchmark for Leftist parties prior to the FDN. Worth 
noting in Table 8 is that the FDN captured almost 30 percent ofthe votes for 1988. After the 
PRD was established, votes for parties of the Left declined to almost nine percent only to climb 
close to 17 percent for the 1994 election. 
In 1988, a comparison of voting percentages of the Left to the more Rightist PAN (Tables 
8 and 7), reveal that percentages for the left nearly doubled those of the PAN. Moreover, the 
1991 percentages favor the PAN, a reversal of the 1988 election. More striking are the 1994 
results in which the PAN placed second with more than one quarter of the voting percentages and 
the PRD short of 17 percent. Considering the Congressional elections as a measure to determine 
party popularity between national elections, a conclusion can be drawn that the PAN has indeed 
consistently drawn votes from the PRI since 1988. 
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4. The Labor Party 
The Labor Party (PT) warrants a discussion here because of the role it played during the 
1991 midtenn and 1994 national elections. As a moderate Leftist party the PT won 1.2 percent 
of the votes in the 1991 congressional poll. 107 According to analysts, the success of Cecilia de 
Soto and the PT in 1994 was allegedly part of a plot by the PRJ to detract votes from the PRD. 
The conspiracy was unfounded as the PRD earned far fewer votes than either the PRJ or the PAN 
in 1994. The PRD would have needed about ten additional percentage points to tie the PAN and 
many more to challenge the PRI. Moreover, the PT won 2.74 percent of the national vote, more 
than any of the other minor parties. 108 
The minority parties all received less than one percent of the votes as follows: the Green 
Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) won .93 percent; the Cardenista Front of the National 
Reconstruction (PFCRN), created in 1947 and until 1994 was a major party on the Left, .85 
percent; the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) .55 percent; the Popular Socialist 
Party (PPS) .47 percent; and the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM) .28 percent. 109 Because these 
percentages are lower than the legally mandated minimum of 1. 5 percent of the 1994 national 
107 Banks, ArthurS., Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. "Mexico." Political Handbook of the 
World. Ed. ArthurS. Banks, Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. Binghamton: CSA 
Publishing, 1996, p. 620. 
108 Mexico and NAFTAReport Sep 29, 1994, p. 3. 
109 MexicoandNAFTAReport Sep291994, p. 3. 
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vote, 110 these parties have either lost their registration, like the PVEM and the PDM, or are no 
longer eligible for public campaign funds, like the PPS, P ARM, and the PFCRN. 111 
In summary, the PRJ which was established as an outgrowth of the Revolution has 
consistently won all national elections since its existence. The PAN is the most stable and well 
organized of the parties. The PRD has not been active long enough to draw any conclusions. A 
fact is that should the parties on the Left pool resources and unite, the chances of a presidential 
candidate are greater than if the parties continue to splinter. 
C. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN MEXICO 
Historically, impartial rules between the PRJ, the PAN, and the PFCRN have never existed. 
On the surface there seems to be some level of fairness of the political party system in Mexico, 
but upon closer examination the playing field is not equal. This section analyzes the 
institutionalization, the fairness, of the Mexican party system to determine where the strengths and 
weaknesses are in relationship to Mexico's progress towards democracy. First, an overview of 
the electoral system is vital to explaining the institutionalization of Mexico's political party system. 
1. The Mexican Electoral System 
Federal electoral laws in Mexico have historically been amended to favor opposition 
groups with representation in the Congress. In 1963 the Federal Elections Commission created 
the "diputados de partido" (deputies of the party)112 so that Congressional seats could be easily 
110 AlcocerV., 1995, p. 61. 
111 U.S. Dept of State. May 1996. 
112 The Deputies are equivalent to the U.S. Representatives. Elections for Deputies occur every 
three years. 
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won by parties that earned 2.5 percent of the national vote. The law allowed each party that 
received the legal minimum votes five seats in the Congress plus one seat for each additional .5 
percent of the national vote. 113 The problem was that many political parties, especially those on 
the Left, could not capture 2.5 percent of the national vote. 
In 1977, the electoral law was again amended and the legally mandated minimum to 
acquire congressional seats was lowered to either 1. 5 percent of the national vote or registering 
65,000 members. Other major revisions included public financing and free radio and television 
time to all parties, the inclusion of the Left in the party system, and an increase of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies to 400, 100 of which were reserved for opposition parties under a 
proportional representation system. 114 
In 1984, the Federal Elections Commission again revised the electoral law and chose 
proportional representation formulas that favored opposition groups. Table 9 shows the 
percentage of seats in the Chamber of Deputies according to political party from 1982 to 1994. 
The table begins with 1982 to provide consistency with the previous table. 
113 Cornelius, Wayne A. "Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985." 
Mexican Politics in Transition. Ed. Judith Gentleman. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, p. 19. 
114 Cornelius, 1987, p. 20. 
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Percentages of Congressional Seats 
PRJ PAN Left 
74.5 12.8 4.3 
72.3 10.3 6.0 
52.0 20.2 27.8 
64.0 17.8 8.2 
60.0 23.8 14.2 
Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188. 
An analysis of Table 9 shows that the PRI in all instances has maintained the majority in 
the Congress. The PAN, in 1988 was third after the success of the FDN. However, in 1991 the 
PAN dropped a few percentage points only to regain their losses in 1994. In addition, the key 
electoral reform between 1986 and 1988 increased the number of seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies to 500, 100 more seats than in 1977.115 The additional seats contributed very little to 
Mexico becoming more democratic as the electoral system was viewed by Mexican citizens as 
favoring the PRJ. 
Administrative changes between 1989 and 1990 included the creation of the Federal Code 
for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) and the newly Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE). The COFIPE was charged with improving elections and some of their initiatives included 
tamperproof photo identification cards for voters and an electoral registry. The IFE was an 
independent organization that consisted of representatives of the executive and legislative 
115 Alcocer V., 1995, p. 59. 
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branches, the political parties, and the citizenry. 116 An autonomous association not dominated by 
the PRJ would make upcoming national elections appear more legitimate than in previous years. 
More importantly and for the first time, the PRJ did not control these groups. 
Before the 1994 election another key reform restructured the Senate so that each state 
increased its share of senators from two to four. The reform also implemented a mixed election 
system for the senators which meant that the "majority party in each state would occupy three 
Senate seats and the fourth would go to the second leading party." Before this revision, senators 
were directly elected by the voters in their respective states. Additionally, Senate terms were to 
coincide with the election of the president. 117 The results of the 1994 national election were that 
the PRJ won 300 of the 500 Deputy seats, the PAN 119, the PRD 69 and the PT 12. In terms of 
the Senators the PRJ won 95 seats, the PAN 26, and the PRD 7; no seats were won by the PT. 118 
In summary, the electoral system clearly is ever-changing in an attempt to become more 
fair and democratic. Since 1978, there have been more major changes to the electoral system than 
between 1929 and 1976. A legitimate electoral system is key to institutionalizing a party system. 
Otherwise, the system is viewed as flawed and open to corruption. The next section analyzes the 
institutionalization ofMexico's party system. 
116 Alcocer V., 1995, pp. 59-60. 
117 Alcocer V., 1995, p. 61. 
118 Mexico and NAFTAReport Sep 29, 1994, p. 2. 
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2. Institutionalization of the Mexican Political Party System 
Mexico's current party system includes all legally recognized parties who maintained at 
least 1. 5 percent of the 1994 national vote. This system includes the PRI, the PAN, the PRD, 
and the PT. The laws governing the party system are grounded in the 1917 Constitution and 
as further stipulated in ongoing electoral amendments initiated by the IFE. This section 
concentrates on the institutionalization of the party system, considering the stability in the rules 
between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, 
and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. 
a. Stability in the Rules Between Interparty Competition 
Mexican electoral reforms occur as additional parties meet the ITIImmum 
qualifications to become registered and as the parties make attempts towards democratizing the 
political system. Between 1946 and 1976 there were very minor changes to the electoral laws but 
by 1 977, electoral reforms preceded midterm and national elections. Between 1977 and 1994 
there were five major reforms to the electoral system: in 1978, 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1994. 119 
Frequent electoral reforms have resulted in unstable rules between interparty competition. 
Reforms of campaign spending ceilings initiated in 1992 went unheeded during the 
1994 presidential election. Of the U.S. $1.3 billion spent on the 1994 elections, the PRI 
accounted for 78 percent, the PAN 10.4 percent, and the PRD less than 4.6 percent. 120 In the state 
ofTabasco, the PRI candidate, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, exceeded spending limits on his 1994 
119 Alcocer V., 1995, p. 59. 
120 
"Zedillo Tries to Keep the Show on the Road as Cardenas Lurches Further to the Left." 
Mexico and NAFTA Report RM 95-02, Feb 23, 1995, p. 3. 
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mayoral campaign. Evidence produced shows that he spent U.S. $76 million on his campaign-
twice the amount that Ernesto Zedillo spent on his presidential campaign. According to the 
electoral authorities, Madrazo spent "70 times what he was allowed to spend."121 This election 
demonstrates how unfair the rules are between parties and how far the PRI can go to control 
voting polls. 
There is more evidence that rules between interparty competition favor the PRI 
who has violated equal access to the media coverage. The Civic Alliance, a Mexican 
nongovernmental organization and political watchdog group, learned that prior to the 1994 
election "television viewers and radio listeners were twice as likely to see and hear Ernesto Zedillo, 
the presidential candidate of the long-ruling [PRI], as to see or hear any of his rivals."122 In 
essence there is no enforcement of stability in the rules and interparty competition as campaign 
spending limits and media coverage are violated by the PRI. 
b. Stable Roots in Society 
For the purpose ofthis thesis, longevity determines the stable roots in society. 
Without a doubt the PRI and PAN are well-established in the Mexican society as they have been 
active since 1929 and 1939, respectively. Up until 1991, the PRI drew dominant support, 70 
percent to 100 percent, from its states ofCampeche, Chiapas, Nuevo Leon, Puebla, Tabasco, and 
121 
"Problems in the Regions: Governor ofNuevo Leon Goes, Madrazo Next?" Mexico and 
NAFTA Report, RM-96-05, May 9, 1996, p. 2. 
122 Fineman, Mark. "Anxious Mexicans Await Day of the Vote; Elections: Despite Government 
Vows to Keep Balloting Honest, Many Fear Fraud, Even Unrest." Los Angeles Times. 
NEXIS. On-line. Aug 21, 1994. 
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San Luis Potosi. 123 In a recent election, the PRJ won control of the 189 townships, the PAN the 
state capital and 21 townships, and the PRD seven townships. 124 Moreover, the PRJ's three 
sectors have helped to sustain its longevity through internal linkages between client and patron -
a characteristic not documented in any other party in Mexico. 
The PAN, which historically drew support from the northern border states, is only 
ten years younger than the PRJ. In recent elections, the PAN has become more competitive in 
terms of gaining governorships, seats in Congress, and other positions of authority. The PAN has 
increased state deputies from 171 to 240; the numbers of mayors have climbed from 118 to 218; 
and the PAN now "rules 25 percent of all Mexicans, almost twice as many as at the beginning of 
the year."125 The PRD, created in 1989, is not yet considered, by this author, as having stable 
roots in society, simply because the organization has been active for only six years. Cardenas does 
not have an outstanding history ofleading parties for any length oftime, as demonstrated by the 
FDN and the PFCRN. The PT, likewise, lacks stable roots in the Mexican society. 
c. Legitimate Electoral Process and Parties 
The PRJ, PAN, PRD, and PT are recognized by the IFE as being legitimate, given 
that each of the parties received more than 1.5 percent ofthe 1994 national vote. However, the 
electoral process is not legitimate because of its inherent flaws. According to Andrew Reding, 
the PRJ for the 1988 national election "resorted to wholesale fraud to maintain its grip on the 
123 Cornelius and Craig, 1991, p. 69. 
124 
"PRJ Slide Gives PAN a Boost: Zedillo's Lack of Leadership Blamed for Deepening Crisis." 
Mexico and NAFTAReportRM-95-12, Dec 1, 1995, p. 2. 
125 Mexico and NAFTA Report Dec 1, 1995, p. 2. 
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presidency."126 "The huge pluralities, 90 percent in many cases, suggest[ed] systemic electoral 
fraud." 127 Moreover, the Mexican government invested U.S. $730 milliod28 in a computerized 
vote-counting device to provide immediate results over national television. When it was obvious 
that the FDN was in the lead, the system conveniently "failed," causing results to be tabulated by 
hand. In days following the election, completed voting ballots were found floating in rivers and 
burning in bonfires along the roads. 129 
Six years and three electoral reforms later, Mexico's electoral system has improved 
but still received considerable criticism over the conduct of elections. During 1994, tens of 
thousands of Mexican poll watchers helped coordinate nearly 1,000 foreign 'visitors' the 
government permitted to witness the election. 130 According to Dan La Botz, the majority of 
election observers reported grave discrepancies of the electoral process. There were irregularities 
in staffings at polling places. Observers were given names of Mexican nationals who were to staff 
the polls. When the observers arrived, they found other nationals in charge. 131 
126 Reding, Andrew. "Mexico: The Crumbling ofthe 'Perfect Dictatorship."' World Policy 
Journal8.2 (Spr 1991): 257. 
127 
"The Cloud Over Reform in Mexico." New York Times. NEXIS. On-line. Nov 17, 1990. 
128 Fineman, Aug 21 , 1994. 
129 Reding, 1991, p. 257. 
13° Fineman, Aug 21, 1994. 
131 La Botz, Dan. "The Election ofZedillo: How Free? How Fair?" Democracy in Mexico: 
Peasant Rebellion and Political Reform. Boston: South End Press, 1995, pp. 213-225. 
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'Visitors' noted PRI members "eyeing" voters going in and out ofthe booths, 
where booths were available, which created immense intimidation for participants. In the absence 
of polling booths, citizens voted out in the open, losing the freedom of a secret-ballot vote. Many 
observers, primarily in rural areas, witnessed Mexicans being turned away from polls either 
because polling places had run out of ballots or the polling location was relocated at the last 
minute. One observer even saw two people in one booth- a PRI member and a first-time elder 
voter. 132 
To underscore that discrepancies in the electoral process are still present, a recent 
local election in the state of Quintana Roo resulted in the PRI winning all eight mayor races with 
a combined 55 percent, compared with 33 percent for the PAN. In what was not perceived as a 
fair election, the opposition has vowed to contest the state results. "[The PAN] complained of' an 
open and brazen complicity' between the head of the Quintana Roo state electoral council and the 
PRJ state governor that were used to perpetrate 'serious irregularities. "'133 
The electoral reform is still the primary concern in Mexico's progress towards 
democracy as the PRI, PAN, PRD, and PT continue to debate issues. One hot topic pertains to 
the proportional representation system and the maintenance of party registration. The PAN and 
the PRD want the threshold for representation set at five percent and the minimum percentage of 
party registration set at three percent. The PT wants the proportional representation set at 2.5 
132 La Botz, 1995, pp. 213-225. 
133 
"PRI Victories Give Zedillo a Boost." San Jose Mercury News Feb 23, 1996, p. 12A. 
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percent and the party registration set at two percent of the total national votes. 134 Other sticking 
points between the parties include: the selection of electoral authorities, the electoral process, the 
way parties compete in elections, and the structure, legality, and representation of parties. 135 
Following these debates, 17 Mexican Constitutional amendments and dozens of 
supplementary bills have been passed. The goal was to expand democracy and eliminate electoral 
fraud. One amendment grants Mexicans living abroad an opportunity to cast absentee ballots for 
the presidential election in the year 2000. Another links the voting system to the federal judiciary. 
For the first time in history, Mexico's supreme court can intervene in electoral disputes. Yet, 
another amendment permits citizens to join a party of their choice instead ofbeing coopted into 
a PRJ sector. 136 
d. Parties Subordinate to Ambitious Leaders 
Mexico does not differ from other Latin American countries where 
"presidencialismo," the personal politics of the president, is prevalent. Ernest A Duff studied the 
relationship between political leaders and political parties in Latin America. He argues that 
political leaders created parties capable of resolving crises with a minimum amount of violence. 137 
Duff gives examples of strong leaders who made a positive impact on the party. Among them are 
134 
"Cobbling Together Another Package: Some Progress, Despite the Posturing." Mexico and 
NAFTA Report RM-96-03, Mar 28, 1996, p. 4. 
135 Mexico and NAFT A Report Mar 28, 1996, p. 4. 
136 Dillon, Sam. "Accord in Mexico Aims at Expanding Democracy and Eliminating Fraud." 
New York Times. Netscape. On-line. Jul 27, 1996. 
137 Duff, Ernest A Leader and Party in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 
67 
President Jose BatHe y Ordonez (1903-1907 and 1911-1915) of Uruguay's Colorado Party, 
President Victor Raul Haya de La Torre (1978-1979) ofPeru's American Popular Revolutionary 
Alliance, President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) of Mexico's PRI, and President R6mulo 
Bentacourt (1945-1948 and 1959-1964) ofVenezuela's Democratic Action Party. 
In Mexico, former President Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) practiced personalistic 
politics in that he utilized the PRI to gain personal wealth while sacrificing the good of the party. 
By the time Salinas left office, he "allegedly garnered over $100 million in unexplained wealth 
during [his] presidential tenure from 1988 to 1994."138 The PRI, however, still remains very much 
a dominant political actor although Salinas no longer resides in Mexico. 
In summary, the evidence shows that institutionalization of the party system in 
Mexico, while improving, is still inadequate because of unbalanced outcomes of each indicator. 
First, electoral reforms to bring about fair party competition only occurred between 1988 and 
1994. Second, the PRI and PAN are the only two parties who have existed for 65 and 55 years, 
respectively; the PRD and PT have experienced only one national election and two midterm 
elections. Third, the political parties are legitimate, but the evidence shows that the electoral 
process has not significantly improved since the 1988 election. Fourth, Salinas typifies a recent 
PRI leader who sacrificed his party for personal gain. 
138 Cooper, Matthew. "Fools and Their Money: From Statesman to Fugitive, Carlos Salinas Had 
Us All Believing in the Mexican Dream." Washington Post, National Weekly Jan 29- Feb 4, 
1996, p. 25. 
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D. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY 
SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
In conclusion, the level of institutionalization of the political party system in Mexico is a 
major drawback to the progress towards democracy. The evidence in relation to the four 
indicators of institutionalization (stable rules between party competition, stable roots in society, 
a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of 
ambitious leaders) clearly shows that the political party system is not equally fair for all parties. 
The evidence indicates variation in the indicators, which in some instances favor one party but not 
the other. For institutionalization of the political party system to become successful each 
indicator must exist for either all or none of the parties. 
Considering the evidence, the conclusion is that there are some major improvements to the 
political party system, but that they are still inadequate. Furthermore, the key is not where Mexico 
is, but the direction in which it is heading. The comparison below shows the status of 
institutionalization of the political party system: 
Indicator 
Stable rules between party competition? 
Stable roots in society? 
Legitimate electoral process? 
Legitimate parties? 
Party subordinated to personal interests 
of a leader? 
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What the evidence shows: 
Present or Absent? 
Absent, but improving 
Present for PRI and PAN; 
absent for PRD and PT 
Absent, but improving 
Present 
Absent for the PAN, PRD, and 
PT; neither absent or present 
for the PRI 
The current system is unfavorable to multi-party competition because ofPRI elites and the 
fortunes they stand to lose should Mexico transition to democracy. Some of the losses that could 
be incurred by the PRI should other parties be "allowed" to compete in politics include the loss 
of benefits reaped through the patron-client relationship. Under Mexico's one-party system, 
clients are indebted to patrons for promotions and jobs in exchange for promises to "vote PRI," 
for example. Since the existence of the ruling party, the pattern of the president has been to enter 
office, employ relatives and close friends in cabinet-level positions, gather a mass fortune 
(normally through illegal means), appoint a successor, leave office, and retire in luxury. The loss 
of these benefits could further deter elites in any regime from becoming democratic. 
For the PRI, the disadvantages of a multi-party system are also linked to why the electoral 
system, especially before 1994, appeared illegitimate. Although numerous reforms have been 
approved to become more democratic, in 1994, observers witnessed "flaws" in the electoral 
process. These "flaws" are ways to ensure that other parties do not compete for office. If parties 
do compete for office, the "flaws" ensure candidates do not stand an equal chance as the PRI at 
winning. The decision to disregard campaign finance laws is another way to ensure that the PRI 
remains in power. The amount of funds spent on campaigns for the PRI versus campaigns for the 
other parties is not even close. The campaign funds spent by Madrazo in the Mexican state of 
Tabasco clearly underscores the PRI's grasp on political power. 
Therefore, Mexico does not have a viable multi-party system because the party system 
itself is not fully institutionalized. That is the playing field is not level for all parties. Stable rules 
between party competition, a legitimate electoral process, and legitimate parties are lacking. Until 
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each indicator applies to all parties, the party system will not become viable. And, as long as there 
is not a viable multi-party system, democracy in Mexico will not be consolidated. 
71 
72 
IV. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and to assess 
the impact ofU.S. foreign policy on Mexico's progress towards democratization. The broader puzzle 
is: why has Mexico failed to democratize? Considering the U.S. agenda to promote democracy in 
Latin America and the substantial amount ofU. S. economic and diplomatic involvement with Mexico, 
one would expect that Mexico's political structure would be more democratized than it currently is. 
Although U.S. foreign policy has played a dramatic role in instituting democracy in Panama and Haiti, 
the policy has had inconsiderable impact on Mexico's progress towards democracy. Some would 
even argue that U.S. foreign policy has negatively impacted Mexico's transition to democracy, given 
Mexico's reluctance to acquiesce to the United States. 
Dahl provides the theoretical framework for this chapter. Within this framework, the second 
section analyzes the historical background of U.S. foreign policies towards Mexico and the nature 
ofU.S. relations with Mexico. The third section analyzes U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and 
its impacts on the democratization process in Mexico. The fourth section contains the conclusion to 
this chapter. 
1. Review of the Literature 
Recently, there has been an explosion ofliterature on U.S.-Mexican relations. A common 
theme ofMexican writers is Mexico's reluctance to subordinate itselfto the United States. For 
example, Adolfo Auguilar Zinser, a former advisor to Mexican President Luis Echeverria Alvarez 
(1970-1976) and a current congressman, argues that the biggest mistake a Mexican presidential 
candidate can make is to gain the endorsement of an American president or any of his appointees. 
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That fear is grounded in history. When the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson expressed preference 
in 1913 for overthrowing Francisco Madero and replacing him with General Vitoriano Huerto, the 
legend of"el beso del diablo"- the kiss of the devil- began. "The kiss" (or the United States) became 
the most expeditious way to kill a candidate's chances to win as office seekers were soon labeled 
puppets of the United States. By 1946, with the election of Avila Camacho, U.S. presidents have 
steered clear of involvement in the Mexican presidential campaigns and, likewise, Mexican 
presidential candidates have not linked themselves with U.S. presidents. 139 At the presidential level, 
U.S. presidents have taken the course of staying out ofMexican presidential campaigns. As a result, 
U.S. influence on Mexico is limited. Efforts to exercise influence are often counter-productive. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Dahl specifies three ways by which external actors can influence democracy in a particular 
country. The first way is through manipulating any combination of variables, such as socioeconomic 
order, equalities and inequalities, subcultures, and beliefs. The second way is through "the actions 
of foreigners who may alter the options available to a regime without necessarily altering the form 
of the regime." The third way is through "outright foreign domination."140 The United States has 
played a major role in initiating democracy in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti through employing Dahl's 
third option. This option is not a U.S. consideration because ofthe nature ofthe U.S.-Mexican 
relationship, discussed below. 
139 Aguilar Zinser Adolfo. "Mexico: The Presidential Problem." Foreign Policy 69 (Winter 1978-
1988): 40-60. 
140 Dahl, 1971, 189-191. 
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The second type of external influence is using political leverage to limit options available to 
the Mexican government. Examples include the United States denying visas to Mexican nationals, 
restricting U.S. citizens from traveling to Mexico, and charging Mexican nationals fees to enter the 
United States via the legal border-crossing points. Realistically, none of these options could be 
effectively enforced. If visas are denied, Mexican nationals will only cross the border illegally out of 
desperation for economic survival. The reactions of Americans being told where not to travel will, 
likewise, go ignored. This form of influence is impossible to enforce, not feasible, and will not be 
addressed in this chapter. Therefore, concerning Mexico, the focus of this chapter is on Dahl's first 
way to affect democratization. 
To characterize the linkage of the United States and Mexico, Bruce M. Bagley refers to the 
U.S.-Mexican relationship as one of asymmetrical interdependence. Bagley further argues that 
"[ n ]owhere in the world is the interrelationship between a developed and a developing country more 
extensive, and the two societies promise to become even more interdependent in coming decades."141 
The incentives for the United States to maintain favorable ties with Mexico are for access to increased 
inexpensive resources, increased trade and jobs, and decreased illegal migration. The incentive for 
Mexico to the United States is continued economic assistance. Throughout this chapter, evidence 
will be presented as to the asymmetries between the United Sates and Mexico. 
3. Methodology 
The argument ofthis chapter is that Mexico should be much more democratic because as 
U.S. international prestige grows the more influential the United States becomes; the more influential 
141 Bagley, Bruce M. "The Politics of Asymmetrical Interdependence: U.S.-Mexican Relations in 
the 1980s." The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region. Ed. H. Michael Erisman. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 141. 
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the United States, the greater likelihood that a particular society will comply with the desires of the 
United States. Applying this argument to Mexico, this means that Mexico should be more democratic 
because of U.S. influence. Employing a case study of Mexico, this chapter focuses on the causal 
(independent) variable ofU.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and the outcome (dependent) variable 
of lack of democratization. The puzzle of this chapter is: why has U.S. foreign policy in favor of 
democratic reform failed to bring about democratization in Mexico? The next section examines a 
historical overview ofU.S. policies towards Mexico and the nature ofU.S. relations with Mexico. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 
1. Background: U.S. Foreign Policies Towards Mexico 
Relations between the United States and Mexico were affected by the Mexican-American War 
(1846-1848) in which the two nations fought over the annexation of Texas. Briefly, in 1846 when 
U.S. President James K. Polk was unable to purchase what today is California and New Mexico, the 
United States and Mexico went to war. The result was that the "United States agreed to make a cash 
payment of$15,000,000 to the Mexican government and to assume $3,250,000 in claims that the 
United States citizens had against [the Mexican] government. For a total of$18,250,000, Mexico's 
territory was reduced by hal£"142 Although Mexico's major loss ofland is no longer at the forefront 
ofU.S.-Mexican relations, Mexican nationals still remember this significant event. 
Beginning in the early 20th century, U.S. foreign policy shifted from isolationism to 
interventionism. The United States intervened in Mexico for the Occupation of Veracruz and to hunt 
for Pancho Villa. In 1914, service members from the USS DOLPHIN were arrested in Tampico 
142 Meyer, Michael C. And Willian L. Sherman. The Course of Mexican History. 5th ed. NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p.351. 
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while purchasing supplies. When Mexican President Huerta refused to apologize, the United States 
bombarded Veracruz. Between 1916 and 1917, U.S. General John Pershing and 10,000 troops 
deployed to Mexico to unsuccessfully search for Pancho Villa, who had entered New Mexico and 
killed 17 U.S. citizens. 143 
Considering the policy and tense relations, in 1933, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
introduced the Good Neighbor Policy. Briefly, this policy included 
essential qualities of a true Pan Americanism [that] must be the same as those which constitute 
a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's 
point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which 
confidence, friendship, and good will are the cornerstones. 144 
After the Good Neighbor Policy, there were ongoing initiatives on both sides of the border 
to improve relations. The spread of communism following World War II provoked U.S. presidents 
to formulate foreign policies to protect the Americas from communism. These policies were 
expressed through the Inter-American Treaty ofReciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Pact 
of 194 7, a regional security system, and the establishment of the Organization of American States in 
1948. With the demise of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, the policy 
shifted to engagement and enlargement. 
Under the U.S. foreign policy of engagement and enlargement, political and economic 
liberalization led to amiable relations as the United States, Canada, and Mexico concluded 
negotiations and agreed on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992. With the 
143 Kryzanek, Michael J. U.S.-Latin American Relations. 2nd ed. NY: Praeger, 1990, p. 49. 
144 Atkins, G. Pope. "The United States." Latin America in the International Political System. 3rd 
ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 120. 
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Mexican government receiving internal and external pressures, Mexico reformed its electoral system 
modestly to become more democratic. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton used the Summit of the 
Americas as the forum to espouse the U.S. foreign policy of promoting democracy towards Latin 
America. 
In summary, throughout the 20th century, U.S. foreign policies toward Mexico were driven 
by global threats (communism), political freedoms (democracy), and liberal trade. The above 
examples illustrate past U.S. policies towards Mexico and how the United States has been extremely 
protective of the Americas. Now that the Cold War has ended and the United States receives a great 
economic benefit from Mexico, the United States has major economic interests in protecting Mexico 
from potential threats. Similarly, Mexico would not want to lose the benefits of trading with the 
United States. The next section examines the U.S. relations with Mexico. 
2. Nature of U.S. Relations with Mexico 
Abraham F. Lowenthal argues that the interpenetration between the United States and Mexico 
has been evident through economic, political, and historical linkages. 145 The asymmetries are stark. 
Economically, there is a developed United States compared to a developing Mexico. The border 
separates the relatively rich Americans from the relatively poor Mexicans. Politically, there is a 
decentralized government in the United States compared to a highly centralized Mexican government 
dominated by the PRI. Historically, the linkages date back to the American-Mexican War of 1846 
when the United States "took" one-half ofMexico's territory. Other examples include: Operation 
Secado in 1947, in which one million Mexicans in the United States were rounded up and returned 
145 Lowenthal, Abraham F. Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 
1990s. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990, pp. 70-112. 
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to Mexico; the last few decades of the United States preventing illegal drugs from crossing the U.S.-
Mexican border; and the 1996 beatings ofMexicans by U.S. border patrol agents which were aired 
throughout the United States and Mexico. 
These instances point out the interpenetration ofU.S. and Mexican affairs. According to 
members of the Binational Commission on the Future of the United States-Mexican Relations, "What 
happens in Mexico City is almost always important to the [United States], and often intimately affects 
Washington's security interests."146 Mexico's problems are increasingly becoming problems in the 
United States because ofthe extent of the intertwined relationship. 
The nature of the U.S.-Mexican relationship is best explained by analyzing recent U.S. 
legislation. In March 1996, the United States approved the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
Act also known as the Helms-Burton Law (HR. 927). Under this law, the United States should 
sanction Mexico for trading and conducting business transactions with the Cuban government. The 
law empowers the U.S. president to "encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit relations 
with Cuba."147 Also, the legislation reduces U.S. foreign aid to countries, like Mexico, that support 
Cuba through regional trade, something the United States advised Mexico to do to expand their 
economy. Officials in Latin American countries have voiced strong opposition to the legislation. 
During U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Latin America, he was met with 
146 Binational Commission on the Future ofUnited States-Mexican Relations. "Foreign Policy 
and Inter-State Relations." The Challenge oflnterdependence: Mexico and the United States. 
NY: University Press of America, 1989, p. 148. 
147 Refer to HR. 927, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Title I, Section 
102 that was approved by the U.S. Congress (74 votes for and 22 votes against) on March 5, 
1996. 
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nationals who conveyed their strongest disapproval ofthe Helms-Burton Law. 148 As Cuba's third 
top investor, Mexico is faced with choosing between supporting U.S. demands or suffering the 
consequences espoused by the United States. 
According to U.S. Army Major Craig A Deare, the Helms-Burton legislation threw a wrench 
in the U.S. current policy towards Mexico, especially after the recent approval ofNAFTA and the 
March 1, 1996 certification ofMexico for financial assistance. The approval ofthe law has resulted 
in U.S. and Mexican officials being bombarded routinely with questions challenging the implications 
of the law. 149 In any case, the United States has given Mexico an option to comply with the new law 
or face the consequences ofU.S. sanctions. 150 James Jones, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, said 
that the "act is susceptible to being amended by future U.S. Congress sessions but in the meantime 
countries doing business with Cuba after the implementation of the act will be punished."151 What 
remains to be seen is the law's impact on future policy and relations between the two countries. The 
law, approved before Christopher's trip to Mexico, was not on the agenda during his visit to Mexico 
City but received considerable coverage during a question-and-answer session. 152 
148 
"The Americas: Falling Out with Uncle Sam." The Economist. NEXIS. On-line. March 16, 
1996. 
149 Deare, Craig A Personal interview. May 23, 1996. Major Deare is the Country Director for 
Mexico in the Office of the Secreatary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Inter-American 
Region. 
150 Newman, Lucia. "Mexico Bucks U.S. Pressure to Drop Cuba Trade." CNN. Netscape. 
On-line. May 29, 1996. 
151 Angeles Jimenez, Alejandro. "Jones Lauds Anti-Drug Law, Defends H-B." The News. 
Netscape. On-line. May 28, 1996. 
152 Meade, Robert. Personal interview. May 28, 1996. Mr. Meade is the Caribbean Affairs Desk 
Officer at the U.S. Information Agency. 
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Why is the Helms-Burton Law relevant to U.S.-Mexico relations? First, the law creates 
strains in relations between the two nations. The law weakens the progress of the Binational 
Commission by ordering Mexico to either sever business ties with Cuba or accept U.S. sanctions. 
Second, after a "hands-oft" U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico, the law intervenes in Mexican affairs 
and dictates Mexico's business partners. U.S. foreign policy and the Helms-Burton Law send 
conflicting messages as to what U.S. interests really are in Mexico. On the one hand, the United 
States is interested in a democratic Mexico. On the other hand, the United States wants to influence 
Mexican commerce by approving its trading partners. In summary, the contradiction ofU.S. foreign 
policy, discussed later, and the Helms-Burton Law baffles political scientists on both sides of the 
border. 
3. U.S.-Mexican Economic Relations 
Economically, Mexico matters to the United States. During the 1970's oil boom, Mexico 
became a major supplier of petroleum to the United States. The United States "was compelled to 
acknowledge its dependence on foreign petroleum just as Mexico discovered vast reserves of oil and 
natural gas ... By the 1980s Mexico was the third largest trading partner ofthe United States."153 
As of 1996, the United States became Mexico's largest trading partner. 
153 Pastor, Robert A. and Jorge G. Castaneda. "Introduction." Limits to Friendship: The United 
States and Mexico. NY: Vintage Books, 1989, p.4. 
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Table 10 presents trade data between the United States and Mexico. 
Table 10 - Trade Data between the United States and Mexico 
(in U.S. billion dollars) 
1992 1993 1994 
Imports to Mexico US$ % US$ % US$ % 
From the US 39 94 48 94 55 92 
Total FTAA 41 100 47 100 56 100 
From theEU 6 N/A 7 N/A 9 N/A 
From Japan 2 N/A 3 N/A 5 N/A 
Total World Imports 53 N/A 65 N/A 80 N/A 
Exports from Mexico 
To the US 37 92 43 92 52 93 
Total FTAA 41 100 47 100 56 100 
TotheEU 3 N/A 3 N/A 3 N/A 
To Japan .8 N/A .7 N/A .8 N/A 
Total World Exports 46 N/A 52 N/A 61 N/A 
Percentage data includes the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FT AA) which includes 34 Latin 
American countries. 
Source: Inter American Development Bank. Integration and Regional Programs Department, Statistics 
and Quantitative Analysis and DAT AINT AL. Netscape. On-line. 1996. 
The evidence clearly shows that Mexico receives more imports from the United States than any other 
trading partner, including the 15 European countries and Japan. This element alone underscores one 
major asymmetry between the United States and Mexico. Mexico imports more from the United 
States than Mexico exports to the United States, which underscores the economic dependency 
Mexico has on the United States. Data from the 15 European countries, Japan, and the world is 
provided to show that although Mexico does have other trading partners, the United States is by far 
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Mexico's major trading partner and is in the best economic position to influence political actions in 
Mexico. 
Not only does Mexico rely more heavily on the United States for trade, the United States has 
recently provided Mexico with economic assistance. In December 1994 the world witnessed the 
devaluation ofMexico's currency, the peso. By January 1995, rather than ignoring Mexico's financial 
crises, President Clinton invoked the executive power and loaned Mexico U.S. $20 billion through 
the U.S. Treasury's Economic Stabilization Fund. 154 
From the perspective of the United States, there were three advantages of rescuing the 
Mexican economy. The first was that the bailout was expected to save 700,000 American jobs. 155 
The second was that it cushioned the ramifications to other countries beyond Mexico. U.S. non-
involvement would have jeopardized political and economic progress elsewhere in Latin America. 
Moreover, a "collapse of the peso and the consequent ruin of the Mexican economy would have 
weakened the U.S. dollar, hurt exports, and caused convulsions throughout Latin America's Southern 
Cone Common Market and other emerging markets."156 At stake was the potential loss ofMexico 
as the third largest trading partner of the United States and the losses that U.S. companies would 
incur. 
154 Knight, EdwardS. "The Mexico Economic Support Program." Hearing Before the 
Committee on International Relations House ofRepresentatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 
Mar 7, 1995,p. 63. 
155 U.S. Dept of State. Dispatch. "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Release." 
U.S. Foreign Affairs Data Bank. 1995. CD-ROM. Mar 13, 1995. 
156 Chase, RobertS., Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy. "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy." 
Foreign Affairs. NEXIS. On-line. Jan 1996. 
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Third, a crisis in Mexico threatens the security of American borders and citizens. According 
to Robert A Pastor and Jorge G. Castaneda, "Instability in Mexico [has] more serious consequences 
for the [United States] than instability in any other country."157 Had the United States failed to lend 
money to Mexico, no doubt some Mexicans would have fled north across the border in search of jobs 
and higher wages. Even without a crisis the U.S. border patrol agents are already overwhelmed with 
illegal immigrants bound for the United States. Detentions of illegal aliens increased from 102,156 
in January 1995 to 169,463 in January 1996 and arrests have skyrocketed in a few traditionally less 
traveled places. 158 Most apprehended immigrants who are processed for illegal entry, and repatriated 
to Mexico, vow that they will cross the border again. In summary of the economic relations between 
the United States and Mexico, economic measures have been the primary means for the United States 
to maintain positive relations with Mexico. More on economic assistance will be provided later in 
this chapter. 
To conclude this historical perspective, the background to U.S. policies towards Mexico and 
the nature of the relations between each country are relevant and worth considering in the formulation 
of U.S. policy towards Mexico. The more linkages the United States has with Mexico, and vice 
versa, the more complex the relationship. The more complex the relationship, the more difficult the 
policy becomes to draft. At stake for the United States is the loss of economic advantages provided 
by Mexico and the decline of relations between the United States and Mexico. Moreover, the United 
157 Pastor and Castaneda, 1994, p. 10. 
158 Of the nine border sectors (San Diego and El Centro, CA; Yuma and Tucson, AZ; El Paso, 
Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen, TX), less traveled places include Tucson, Yuma and El 
Centro, AZ with increases of 116 percent, 144 percent, and 278 percent, respectively. Verhovek, 
Sam Howe. "With Detentions Up, Border Is Still Porous." New York Times. NEXIS. On-line. 
Feb 13, 1996. 
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States does not want to jeopardize relations with the Mexican government by espousing a too-
aggressive foreign policy. The next section analyzes the current U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. 
C. AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MEXICO 
1. The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Mexico 
Broadly, current U.S. foreign policy outlines five "challenges," two ofwhich are relevant to 
the study ofMexico. The first pertains to economics, including increasing trade, exports, and jobs. 
These economic aspects strengthen the United States domestically and globally and are mutually 
reinforcing for countries that trade with the United States. The second relevant area is the reduction 
of international terrorists, criminals, and narcotics traffickers. The global strategy includes "intensive 
diplomacy to ensure that other nations fulfill their international obligations [and] broader international 
cooperation in asset forfeiture and money laundering .... " Promoting democracy and stability in 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa are also concerns of the policy. The other "challenges" in U.S. 
foreign policy that are not relevant to the U.S.-Mexican relationship include reinforcing the security 
of the European states, aiding the peace process in the Middle East, and committing to non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 159 
During his May 1996 trip to Mexico City, Secretary Christopher asserted that the United 
States has a vital interest in "a stable, prosperous, and democratic Mexico."160 Mexico has some of 
the basics of democracy, such as elections, presidential term limits, and an increasingly diverse press, 
159 U.S. Dept of State. "Press Briefing on U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission." U.S. Foreign 
Affairs Data Bank. 1995. CD-ROM. Feb 20, 1995. 
160 U.S. Dept of State. Office ofthe Spokesman. "Remarks by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher upon Arrival in Mexico City for U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission Meeting." 
Department of State Dispatch. Netscape. On-line. May 6, 1996. 
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but falls short of other prerequisite characteristics.161 However, the United States has taken a "hands-
off' approach to democratization in Mexico. Mexico has never been a full democracy, yet since 
World War II, the United States has conducted business transactions with Mexico. 
According to Donald E. Schulz, "In the past, Washington has almost always valued stability 
over democracy."162 There are at least two advantages of a stable Mexican regime: less illegal 
immigration to the United States and trade. In terms of illegal immigration, an unstable Mexico could 
provoke more Mexicans to flee across the U.S.-Mexican border. As a result, the U.S. president 
would need to take increased actions to secure the southern border. Second, with instability comes 
the possibility of jeopardizing trade relations with Mexico. These trade relations, already analyzed, 
are important to both Mexico and the United States. 
2. An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Mexico 
This section analyzes the effectiveness ofU.S. foreign policy on democracy in Mexico using 
the economic variable as espoused by Dahl. Dahl's theory of external influence contributing towards 
democracy applies in the case ofU.S. relations with Mexico. Table 10 underscored the strength of 
economic linkages between the United States and Mexico. Because ofthe linkage ofMexico's 
economy to U.S. trade, manipulating Dahl's economic variable has resulted in a more, but not fully, 
democratic Mexico. 
161 Some ofthe democratic characteristics that Mexico's political system lacks include secret 
ballot votes, fear of reprisals among dissenters ofthe ruling party, and fair elections. 
162 Schulz, Donald E. "Through a Glass Darkly: On the Challenges and Enigmas of Mexico's 
Future." Mexican Studies 12.1 (Winter 1996): 135. 
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Table 11 shows U.S. economic assistance to Mexico from 1946 to 1994. 
Table 11 -U.S. Economic Assistance in Loans and Grants: 1946-1994 
(in millions ofU.S. dollars, rounded to the nearest even dollar) 
1946- 1949- 1953- 1962-
1948 1952 1961 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total 
Total Latin America 98 98 1,552 24,811 1,562 1,320 1,318 942 30,547 
Total Mexico 43 51 40 415 58 40 32 11 670 
Figures do not include military assistance or other U.S. government loans. Row totals may not add 
up to the totals because of adjustments of capitalized interests, net obligations, and other 
adjustments. 
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loaned and Grants and 
Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1. 1945-
September 1994. Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 83, 104. 
Between 1946 and 1994, the United States extended $670 million to Mexico for foreign assistance. 
That is an insignificant amount considering that in 1995, the U.S. lent Mexico $20 billion to help 
soften the blow of the devalued peso and limit its devastating affects throughout the Latin American 
region. Since 1991, U.S. aid to Mexico has consistently decreased. This may be because the United 
States no longer has the wherewithal to continue such aid. With the money that the United States 
has given or lent to Mexico, the evidence shows that there is some linkage between foreign economic 
assistance and democratization. 
If the United States desires to provide economic assistance as a means to affect the 
democratization process in Mexico, there are several options available: to continue the present level 
of aid, to reduce aid, or to increase aid. Most Americans would oppose an increase in aid and instead 
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would opt to maintain roughly the current level of aid, although at a slightly lower level. A significant 
decline in U.S. aid could spark an economic crisis in Mexico causing Mexicans to cross the border 
illegally. A lack of aid could cause a decrease in Mexican jobs, which could result in fewer exports 
from the United States to Mexico. This means that the United States would have to find other 
markets for its goods. In essence, the devastating consequences are that both countries sacrifice the 
benefits of trading with each other. 
There are other economic variables which could also be manipulated: loans through the 
World Trade Organization, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the U.S. Economic 
Stabilization Fund. The United States exercises considerable influence in international organizations, 
and could utilize that influence to further assist Mexico. 
To summarize, U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico has not produced full democracy in Mexico. 
Political leverage and domination are not feasible options to bring about democracy in Mexico. 
Dahl's theory of impacting democratizaton through manipulating foreign policy variables may be 
applicable to other countries, where economic ties are not as strong as they are between the United 
States and Mexico, and where countries lack a common border. Since Dahl's theory falls short when 
applied to Mexico, perhaps arguments that democratization should come from internal factors beg 
consideration for Mexico. 
D. CONCLUSION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico from 1945 until 1990 stemmed from major 
global threats to the security of the Americas. The nature ofU.S. relations with Mexico varied from 
fiiendly to strained, depending on the era. The current foreign policy towards Mexico stresses U.S. 
interests and democracy. U.S. relations with Mexico, however, have been strained because the 
88 
Helms-Burton Law dictates Mexico's business partners must meet U.S. approval. Scholars who 
generalize that the United States has dramatic influence in changing political systems should 
reconsider the substantial economic and border-related linkages like those between the United States 
and Mexico, which seem to limit U.S. political influence. 
An analysis of the U.S. foreign policy clearly shows interest in Mexico's progress towards 
democratization through economic measures. The mere linkage of Mexico to the United States 
clearly demonstrates the pull of influence towards democracy but not necessarily the acceptance of 
democracy by the ruling Mexican elite. The mixed results of foreign influence to produce democracy 
in Mexico leads researchers to study the role of internal factors. A major barrier to democracy is the 
absence of a fair political party system. Mexico has been a single party state, dominated by the PRI. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the biggest obstacle to democracy in Mexico is the PRI and the 
major losses it could incur should Mexico democratize. 
The United States, however, has supported Mexican democratic initiatives by encouraging 
U.S. citizens to observe the 1994 presidential election. Concerning Mexico, recent U.S. policy has 
generally not been aggressive or interventionist, but instead supportive, with agreements coordinated 
through governmental and nongovernmental organizations. A harsh and more intrusive policy would 
be counterproductive and jeopardize relations with the Mexican government. U.S. interference in 
the Mexican democratization process could become counterproductive because at stake are Mexico's 





The purpose of the thesis was to analyze why Mexico's political system has failed to 
democratize and what its prospects are for the future. Three causal variables were analyzed to 
explain Mexico's lack of democratization (the outcome variable): the lack of an institutionalized 
political party system, the civilian control of the military, and the role ofU.S. foreign policy through 
economic assistance. 
Mexico is the exception in many instances because theories pertaining to other Latin American 
countries are not necessarily applicable to Mexico. Concerning the armed forces, Zagorski theorized 
that subordinating the military to civilian control is necessary for democracy. But in Mexico, civilian 
control of the military is evident; democracy is not. Mexico's military grew politically active during 
the Revolution but was eventually subordinated to civilian control. To assert its control of the 
military, civilians encouraged the military to become more professional, less political, and more 
autonomous. Because Mexico employs its military as an internal police, recent "warlike" actions 
against innocent civilians have worsened relations between civil society and the military. The two 
major negative events that widened the gap between civilian and military relations since the 
Revolution were the 1968 student demonstration and the 1994 repression of the Chiapas uprising. 
Because civilian control of the military alone has not brought about democracy in Mexico, civilian 
control of the military is a necessary, but insufficient condition for democracy. 
Concerning the party system, Mexico has various political parties, some with a long history 
and tradition. This would seem to support democratization. Mainwaring and Scully have theorized 
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that an institutionalized political party system helps guarantee democracy. Upon closer examination 
of the four characteristics of an institutionalized party system, the evidence shows that Mexico's 
political party system does not equally favor all officially recognized parties. The four characteristics 
include stability in the rules between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral 
process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. The 
rules clearly favor the PRJ; the PRJ and PAN are the only two parties that have roots in society; the 
electoral process is undergoing reform; and the PRI is subordinated to personal interests of its leader, 
the president. Perhaps Mexico's elite should heed the advice of Charles G. Gillespie who wrote on 
democratization in Paraguay: "The best way for a ruling party to adopt to a genuine situation of 
multi-party competition is for it to allow dissident strains of opinion to flower in its own midst."163 
Applied to Mexico, this would mean allowing for greater pluralism within the PRJ itself. This would 
then help the PAN and PRD to develop stronger political parties while the PRJ is in power. 
Finally, foreign influence is often posited as being important in democratization. The United 
States has been a champion of democracy, and yet its neighbor, Mexico, has failed to fully 
democratize. Dahl argues that economic variables are one way a developed country can manipulate 
a developing country to become democratic. Since 1946, the United States has consistently provided 
Mexico with economic assistance. Yet Mexico has never experienced full democracy. Moreover, 
U.S. support for democracy in Mexico is variable. The United States espouses global democracy, 
but when democracy interferes with U.S. jobs, regional security, and the loss of Mexico as a potential 
163 Gillespie, Charles G. "Democratizating a One-Party State." Journal ofDemocracy 1.4 (Fall 
90): 58. 
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market, democratization of Mexico becomes less important. Nowhere on record has the United 
States taken a strong and concerted stand on behalf of democracy in Mexico. 
In summary, what scholars have theorized about democratization does not necessarily apply 
to Mexico. A politically lame military and a competitive political party system are minimum 
preconditions of democracy. External influence can bolster democratization. In Mexico, a politically 
lame military clearly exists. Political parties are vibrant, but the political party system is not fair. 
And, while the United States wields considerable influence with relations with Mexico, that influence 
has failed to yield full democracy. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Given the above assessment, there is no guarantee that full democracy will be brought about 
in Mexico. Currently, there are at least three directions in which the Mexican regime can head: 1) · 
the regime can become more authoritarian, like Mexico prior to 1970; 2) it can maintain course and 
make no changes to the existing structure, allowing the PRI to remain in power; or 3) it can become 
more democratic by lifting restricted political party competition, conducting free and fair elections, 
and promoting freer civil and political liberties. The authoritarian regime is part of Mexico's heritage; 
the democratic structure will be a new experience. 
According to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, a country's transition to 
democracy is the interval between one political regime and another, 164 which has yet to occur in 
Mexico. However, the transition from liberalization (redefining and extending rights)165 to democracy 
164 O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 
1986, p. 6. 
165 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 7. 
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in Mexico is happening, though at a snail's pace. In 1990, Cornelius suggested various reasons why 
Mexico's democratization appeared to be crawling along: poorly institutionalized opposition parties; 
no credible alternative to the PRI at the national level; the reduction of influence of PRI sectoral 
bosses and local structures; the dedication ofthe rural agrarian farmers to vote PRI; the lack of 
"young Turks" to join the PRI at the state and local levels; the reticence of reigning presidents to 
carry out political reforms; and the PRI distrust of the motives, policy-making, and competence of 
the opposition.166 Since 1990, Mexico has made progress in its transition towards democracy. The 
most obvious improvements are recent Constitutional amendments and electoral reforms to 
"improve" democracy, such as granting Mexicans living abroad an opportunity to cast absentee 
ballots for the upcoming presidential election and permitting citizens to join a party of their choice 
instead ofbeing coopted into a PRI sector. In 2000, the elections of the mayor ofMexico City and 
the president, should they be free and fair, will be a test of democratization and perhaps transition in 
Mexico. 
Given the conditions noted by Cornelius above, the prospects for democracy are cloudy. The 
PRI' s power structure established during the Revolution is virtually immutable. Schulz predicts that 
Mexico's prospects are mixed because of the costs for the PRI and the president. He also anticipates 
a long and drawn out democratization process that could take decades to complete. 167 Concerning 
the costs, a progressive president may risk an assassination attempt from members of his own party 
who want the political system to remain as it is. Luis Donaldo Colosio, the 1994 presidential 
166 Cornelius, Wayne A. "Mexico: Salinas at the Crossroads." Journal ofDemocracy 1.3 
(Summer 1990): 60-63. 
167 Schulz, Donald E., 1996, p. 138. 
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candidate, was gunned down in Tijuana, possibly because of his platform of promoting democracy, 
especially within the PRI. 
One manner in which the PRI risks an erosion of the party's dominance is through PRI 
infighting. During the PRI' s September 1996 convention, tensions erupted between the party's 
reform-minded leaders and the old guard of anti-reformers (also known as dinosaurs) about the 
qualifications of future presidential candidates. The convention established that the candidate must 
have held elective office and have been a PRI party member for at least ten years. 168 This was a 
victory for the dinosaurs, who resented the fact that Mexico's last three presidents, considered 
technocrats, never held elected office prior to winning the national election. 
Before the 1994 presidential election, Denise Dresser analyzed five scenarios for Mexico, 
which are appropriate for the upcoming presidential election in the year 2000. The first is a 
"recognized victory" in which either the PAN or the PRD defeats the PRI. The second is a 
"fraudulent PRI victory with governability," which is what happened during the 1988 election. 
During this scenario, the PRI victory is disputed by other political parties, but the PRI still remains 
in power. The third is a "PRI victory without governability." In this case, the PRI victory is disputed 
intensely by opposition parties and citizens. The PRI presidential candidate would be forced to 
resign, an interim president would be installed, and another presidential election would take place. 
The fourth is a "PRI victory endorsed only by the PAN." The final scenario is a "PRI victory 
endorsed by both the PAN and the PRD."169 The 1994 election came close to this scenario. The first 
168 Anderson, John Ward. "Mexican Ruling Party 'Dinosaurs' Win Round." Washington Post. 
Netscape. On-line. Sep 28, 1996. 
169 Dresser, Denise. "Five Scenarios for Mexico." Journal ofDemocracy 5.3 (Jul 194): 76-69. 
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scenario is clearly the solution that seals Mexico's transition to democracy. The fifth scenario could 
be a step toward the first scenario in a later election. 
The PRI will attempt to hold on to power as long as possible, as other groups try to gain 
more political power. Some strategies to help the PRI maintain its power include revising electoral 
laws to appear to favor "disadvantaged" political parties, refusing to welcome viable opposition 
parties to the political arena, controlling elections through historical methods, and strengthening the 
PRI through "anti-reformist" rules as demonstrated during the national convention. Other groups 
within civil society, however, will demand greater political freedoms. Membership within the PRI' s 
three sectors will decline as more citizens join other civil organizations not controlled by the PRI. 
Mexico will transition from a dominant party nation-state to a multiparty state, but the questions are 
whether the transition will be peaceful, when will the transition occur, and at what pace. 
To underscore that PRI elites will hold on to power as long as possible and that democracy 
is not in the forefront ofMexican affairs, in his September 1996 State of the Union Address, President 
Zedillo focused on the economy and the retaliation of the Popular Revolutionary Army. Zedillo only 
briefly mentioned the importance of democracy to Mexico.170 Zedillo' s address would have been the 
perfect time to brief Mexicans on what Constitutional changes and electoral reforms have occurred 
and what they mean for democracy. Clearly, the democratization ofMexico is not as important as 
some in the PRI claimed after the 1988 presidential election. 
For many Mexicans, democracy is only rhetoric that the PRI espouses to maintain support. 
In a La Reforma poll of 1,500 Mexican adults in 25 states who were interviewed in their homes 
170 Preston, Julia. "Mexican Leader Vows to Fight New Guerrilla Violence." New York Times. 
Netscape. On-line. Sep 2, 1996. 
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between August 1 and August 7, 1996, many did not see Mexico becoming more democratic. Of 
those interviewed, 40 percent said that Mexico is no more democratic now than it was three years 
ago; 19 percent said that there is less democracy now; and 33 percent said that Mexico is more 
democratic. 171 In short, the prolonged democratization process does not guarantee democracy in 
Mexico and the prospects for democratization are uncertain. 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
All American citizens should be concerned about the political situation in Mexico and the 
implications for the United States. Mexico's political system affects the United States. Major shared 
interests between the United States and Mexico include controlling a permeable 2,000 mile border, 
expanding trade, decreasing illegal immigration, and stemming the flow of illegal drug trafficking into 
the United States. With the democratization of Mexico, illegal immigration into the United States 
from Mexico could decrease if Mexico became more stable, and especially if bilateral trade were to 
increase. Most economists agree that trade makes nations wealthier. Income earned through trade 
can be better spent within a nation's borders by creating jobs. Stemming the flow of illegal drugs will 
only occur if the demand for the product decreases. 
For some, there is also the concern that should the PRD win an election, Mexico could 
become unstable. A PRD victory could hurt U.S.-Mexican relations and wreak havoc on present 
trading practices. A more nationalist political system in Mexico would force the United States to 
confront issues, such as: will the United States continue to trade with Mexico, how will the border 
be reinforced, and how will U.S. citizens and their properties be safeguarded against potential threats? 
171 The margin of error is plus or minus three percent. The poll was conducted jointly between the 
Los Angeles Time and La Reforma. Fineman, Mark. "The Times Poll: Mexicans See Their 
Nation in Moral Decline." Los Angeles Times. Netscape. On-line. Sep 14, 1996. 
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In addition to considering the implications ofU.S. policies for Mexico's political structure, 
there are a few approaches the United States can take in its relations with Mexico. Lowenthal offers 
four options for U.S. policy towards Mexico: adopt a nationalist approach, address binational issues 
one issue at a time, adopt a special relationship with Mexico, and adopt a broader policy that focuses 
on major issues in Latin America. 172 
The first option is for the United States to adopt a nationalist approach of ignoring concerns 
in Mexico and focusing on those within U.S. borders. This author believes the nationalistic approach 
limits U.S. leadership in Latin America and goes against U.S. foreign policy and advances made 
during the 1994 Summit of the Americas. Furthermore, this approach prevents the United States 
from protecting its vital interests in Mexico, like trade. This approach could attempt to prevent illegal 
immigration from occurring, but realistically, totally sealing off the border is impossible. 
The second option is to continue addressing individual issues. Since U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter and Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo created the Binational Commission in 1978, it has 
been the primary means to discuss and resolve issues. The nature of the interdependent relationship 
between the United States and Mexico makes this recommendation feasible. The United States and 
Mexico share a complex relationship within which each issue could be individually addressed. 
Third, a special relationship between the United States and Mexico already exists. The 
proximity and interrelated economic, political, and historical asymmetries make the U.S.-Mexican 
relationship delicate. This relationship dates back at least to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and will 
continue as long as the two countries share a border. 
172 Lowenthal, 1990, pp. 105-109. 
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The final option is to ignore a special relationship with Mexico and adopt broader policies that 
generally pertain to Latin America. As discussed before, the nature of the complex relationship 
prevents the United States from totally ignoring events in Mexico. This author believes that with the 
economic advantages both the United States and Mexico reap through trading with one another, 
ignoring Mexico could hurt the United States. 
This author argues for Lowenthal's third option. U.S. policy towards Mexico should clearly 
state U.S. interests in Mexico and provide a ranking ofU.S. priorities. Currently, there seems to be 
a conflict between trading with and supporting democratization in Mexico. Which is the most 
important? The author believes that while a fully democratic Mexico may create short-term instability 
and pose special challenges to U.S. foreign policy, in the long term, a democratic Mexico is in the 
best interest of the United States. There is abundant evidence that democracies most fully satisfy the 
social and economic demands of its citizens. A democratic Mexico will be more effective in stemming 
the flow of migration to the United States because democratizations should assist in improving 
socioeconomic conditions in Mexico. 
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173 Alcocer V., 1995, p. 59. 
Key Reforms 
Party system expanded from 4 officially recognized parties (PRI, 
PAN, PPS, and PARM) to 7 (adding PCM, PST, and PDM); pro-
portional representation introduced in Chamber of Deputies: 
total number of deputies increased from 300 to 400, of which the 
original 300 remained "uninominal" (elected by majority vote 
within each of Mexico's 300 voting districts) and the new 100 
seats were to be "plurinominal" (elected according to the per-
centage of votes cast for each party in each of five zones into 
which the country is divided for that purpose, with an equal 
number of representatives from each zone). 
Federal Electoral Code enacted; Chamber of Deputies enlarged 
to 500, with 300 uninominal representatives and 200 plurinomi-
nal; Senate terms changed from concurrent with the presidential 
sexenio to half concurrent, half starting at midterm (concurrent 
terms reinstituted in 1993 reforms). 
Constitutional amendments to electoral process; Federal Code 
for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) issued, es-
tablishing the independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE); new 
electoral registry developed; tamperproof photo IDs issued to 
voters; sanctioning powers of Federal Electoral Tribunal broad-
ened; "governability" clause enacted, guaranteeing majority of 
seats in Chamber of Deputies to ruling party. 
Amendments to Constitution, COFIPE, and electoral law pro-
moting pluralism in Congress (by doubling number of Senate 
seats from 64 to 128 and guaranteeing 25% of Senate seats to 
the leading minority party in each state, by preventing any party 
from holding more than 2/3 of Chamber of Deputies seats, and 
by repealing "governability" clause); establishing campaign-
spending ceilings and prohibiting political contributions by gov-
ernment agencies and officials, the private sector, religious in-
stitutions, and foreign individuals and organizations; expanding 
rules promoting equal access to media coverage of political par-
ties; establishing office for prosecuting electoral crimes and ex-
panding sanctions on such crimes; creating double-blind random 
lottery to select 800,000 citizens to be trained and serve as 
polling officials. 
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5. 1994 Multiparty agreements reached on accountability (external audit 
of voter registry, special prosecutor for electoral crimes, serial 
numbering of ballot stubs); Citizen Counselors on IFE General 
Council (proposed by parties not president, elected by 2/3 ma-
jority in Chamber of Deputies, and given voting majority on 
Council, while party representatives to Council lose right to vote 
on Council decisions); acceptance of international "visitors" 
during federal elections; new voting booth technologies; elec-
toral registry (to be shared with parties monthly before elec-
tions); expanded programs for ensuring reliability of vote 
counts; expanded free media access to parties, monitoring of 
coverage by IFE, suspension of party-paid advertising and gov-
, ernment promotion of PROCAMPO and PRONASOL programs 
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